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THE RIDDLE OF HIRAM REVELS
Richard A. Primus*
In 187o, a black man named Hiram Revels was named to represent Mississippi in the
Senate. Senate Democrats objected to seating him and pointed out that the Cons-
titution specifies that no person may be a senator who has not been a citizen of the
United States for at least nine years. Before the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, the Democrats argued, Revels had not been a citizen on account of
the Supreme Court's 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Thus, even if Revels were
a citizen in 187o, he had held that status for only two years. After three days of heated
and highly publicized debate, the Senate voted to admit Revels.
Modern constitutional law has entirely forgotten the Revels debate. In this Article,
Professor Richard Primus recovers the episode and analyzes the Senate's proceedings as
an instance of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation. He shows how examining our
modern intuitions about the Revels debate can prompt us to endorse certain principles of
constitutional interpretation, in particular the notion that the Civil War altered the
antebellum constitutional regime and the idea that legislatures should be empowered to
interpret constitutional provisions flexibly under certain conditions of transitional
justice. Professor Primus then uses these principles to criticize the Court's 1883 ruling
in the Civil Rights Cases.
INTRODUCTION
In some respects, his journey to Washington followed a familiar
pattern. He worked a variety of jobs, found a calling as a preacher
and a schoolmaster, and served his country in the Civil War.' A few
years after leaving the army, he sought and gained public office, first
as an alderman and then in the Mississippi state legislature. 2 Soon
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. Earlier versions of this Article
were presented at workshops at Columbia Law School, New York University School of Law, the
University of Michigan Law School, the University of Southern California Law School, and the
Yale Law School. I thank all of the organizers and participants in those workshops for their in-
terest and their suggestions. For especially valuable criticism and conversation I thank Don
Herzog, Susan Sturm, and Nelson Tebbe. I also thank Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Michael
Dorf, Ariela Dubler, Noah Feldman, Robert Ferguson, David Franklin, Barry Friedman, Richard
Friedman, Ellen Katz, Gerard Magliocca, Deborah Malamud, Anna-Rose Mathieson, Gillian
Metzger, Henry Monaghan, Richard Pildes, Robert Post, Rebecca Scott, Jed Rubenfeld, Gil Sein-
feld, Reva Siegel, and John Witt. Not least, I thank Margaret Leary and Kent McKeever for in-
valuable library assistance, Mollie Marr and Karen Rushlow for administrative support, and Jes-
sica Berry, Charlotte Houghteling, Bezalel Stern, and Rebecca Torres not only for their material
contributions to this Article but also for being the kind of students who make constitutional law a
joy to teach. Research for this Article was funded in part by the Cook Endowment at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School.
I See Obituary, The Passing of an Honored and Useful Man, SW. CHRISTIAN ADVOC. (New
Orleans), Jan. 31, 1go, at 8.
2 Id.
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thereafter, he was chosen to serve as a United States Senator.3 In a
more literal sense, however, Hiram Revels's journey to Washington
differed from that of anyone elected to Congress since the beginning of
the Republic. As he traveled from Mississippi to the nation's capital,
railroad conductors and steamboat captains required him - senator or
not - to ride in the separate colored compartments. 4
On February 23, 1870, having arrived safely in the District of Co-
lumbia and enjoyed an enthusiastic reception from the local black
community,5 Hiram Revels entered the Senate chamber. The symbol-
ism of the moment was obvious. Nine years earlier, in the very same
room, the last man to serve as a senator from Mississippi - Jefferson
Davis - had broken faith with his country and walked off the floor.6
The chairs belonging to Mississippi's senators had been empty ever
since. In what one newspaper called an act of "poetical retribution," a
black Republican would now occupy Davis's old office,7 representing
not only the interests of Mississippi but also the transformation of
America.
As it happened, however, Revels did not become a senator that day.
As soon as his credentials were read, Senate Democrats objected to
seating him.8 They argued that neither Revels nor any other black
person could hold the office in 187o. As the Democrats pointed out,
the Constitution specifies in Article I, Section 3 that no person may be
a senator who has not been a citizen of the United States for at least
nine years. 9 Assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment was a valid
part of the Constitution, 1o Revels was a citizen of the United States.
He had been born - free - in North Carolina, 1 and Section i of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that all persons born in the United
States and subject to its jurisdiction are American citizens.12 But the
Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified only in 1868, two years be-
fore Revels arrived in Washington. Before 1868, the Democrats ar-
gued, Revels had not been a citizen. Their proof of that proposition
was Dred Scott v. Sandford,13 in which the Supreme Court held that
3 Id.
4 See DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. i, 9-1o (1875) (Wyly, J., dissenting).
5 See Arrival of the Carpet-Bag Negro Senator from Mississippi: A Brief Interview, WORLD
(N.Y.), Jan. 31, 187o, at I (describing the warm reception of and party thrown for Revels upon his
arrival in Washington).
6 See i JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT
220-26 (Thomas Yoseloff 1958) (1881) (recounting his departure from the Senate).
7 The Colored Gentleman in the Senate, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 26, 187o, at 4.
8 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1503 (1870).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
10 Not all Democrats conceded this point. See infra pp. 1686-87.
11 Untitled Obituary, COLORED AM. (D.C.), Jan. 19, 19Ol, at 8.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
13 60 U.S. (i1 How.) 393 (1857).
1682 [Vol. I 19:I168o
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blacks could not be citizens of the United States.' 4 Whatever the law
might be since i868, the Democrats maintained, the law before that
date was stated authoritatively by Dred Scott. Thus, even if Revels
were a citizen in 1870, he had held that status for only two years. He
could not be a senator.
They had a point.
For the next three days, the Senate debated whether Hiram Revels
could take office. In the grand tradition of nineteenth-century senato-
rial debate on constitutional issues, 5 senators argued at length about
the meaning of the Civil War, the respect due to the Supreme Court,
and the raw question of whether black men could be high-level par-
ticipants in American government. Newspapers lavished attention on
the event.16 And at the end of the highly publicized affair, the Senate
decided that Revels could sit.17
Modern constitutional law has entirely forgotten the Revels debate.
It is not covered in textbooks, not written about in law reviews, not
discussed by law professors, and not cited by judges. 18 In short, it is
wholly absent from our constitutional discourse. Given the enormous
attention the debate commanded in its day, the prominent forum
where it occurred, and the long-term salience of race in American law,
this absence marks a tremendous act of collective forgetting.' 9 This
Article redresses that absence, recovering Revels for our collective
stock of constitutional knowledge.
14 Id. at 4o6.
15 Cf. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 209, 221-40
(1984) (describing senatorial debate as central to American constitutional discourse in the nine-
teenth century).
16 See, e.g., Admission of the Octoroon from Mississippi into the Senate, WORLD (N.Y.), Feb.
26, 187o, at i; Congressional: Credentials of Senator Revels, of Mississippi, Presented, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Feb. 24, 187o, at 4; Forty-First Congress, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 24, 187o, at 3; The
History of Ten Years, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 2, 187o, at 2ii; A Memorable Day in the United
States Senate, NEW ERA (D.C.), Mar. 3, 187o, at 3; Washington: Admission of Senator Revels,
Jeff. Davis' Successor, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 187 o , at i; Washington: Further Debate on the Case of
the Colored Senator Elect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, I87o, at 5; Washington: The Mississippi Gorilla
Admitted to the Senate, CINCINNATI DAILY ENQUIRER, Feb. 26, I87o , at i.
17 See Congress: The Colored Member Admitted to His Seat in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 187o, at i [hereinafter Colored Member].
18 There is no mention of the Revels debate in any major constitutional law casebook or in any
law review available on Westlaw. Neither is there any mention of the Revels controversy in any
state or federal judicial opinion available on Westlaw, from any time within the last hundred
years. I am pleased to report, however, that the editors of one constitutional law casebook -
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (Paul Brest et al. eds.) - have informed
me that they now intend to include the Revels debate in their next edition.
19 On collective memory and collective forgetting, see J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE
203-04 (1998), and PAUL CONNERTON, HOW SOCIETIES REMEMBER (1989). On the specific
role of collective memory and collective forgetting with respect to Civil War and Reconstruction
issues, see DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEM-
ORY (2001).
16832006]
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In Part I of this Article, I recover the Revels debate for constitu-
tional law and analyze the Senate's proceedings as an instance of non-judicial constitutional interpretation. During the debate, some sena-
tors constructed intricate readings of the written Constitution to
support their views on the Revels question. A greater number of sena-
tors looked past the constitutional text and argued directly about race
and the significance of the Civil War. All of these senators, however,
were engaged in constitutional argument in the best sense of that term.
Constitutional issues, I contend, are those that are basic to the work-
ings of government, whether or not they concern the reading of spe-
cific words in the written Constitution. On that understanding, the
status of African Americans and the legal significance of the Civil War
were central constitutional issues in 1870. Moreover, most of the par-
ticipating senators seem to have treated the debate as an authentic
clash of principles rather than as an occasion for using any available
means to achieve a partisan end. The Revels debate is accordingly a
leading example of constitutional interpretation - or perhaps constitu-
tional construction - by a legislative body.
In Part II, I show how examining our modern intuitions about the
Revels debate can prompt us to endorse particular principles of consti-
tutional interpretation. Nearly all twenty-first-century Americans will
think that Revels should have been seated. Indeed, most will think
that answer obvious. It is worth thinking carefully, however, about
what principle would justify that result as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, and I describe two possibilities. Readers who endorse
either principle should consider how the relevant rationale would ap-
ply in other cases as well.
One justification for seating Revels looks to history as a source of
constitutional authority. It holds, with many of the Republican sena-
tors of 187o and in a mode described in various ways by modern theo-
rists,20 that events of the Civil War era changed the Constitution even
more than the text of the Reconstruction Amendments indicates. A
second justification is rooted in democratic theory. Part of the reason
why constitutional rules can legitimately trump political majorities is
that the Constitution embodies past democratic decisions.2 1 But the
constitutional authorities that would have excluded Revels from the
Senate - Article I, Dred Scott, and even the Fourteenth Amendment
- were all products of decisionmaking processes in which blacks
20 See, e.g., 2 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99-254
(1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1997).
21 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, i8 HARV. L. REV. 1787
(2oo5) (reviewing possible relationships between past decisionmaking and constitutional legiti-
macy, and also discussing other factors supporting constitutional legitimacy).
1684 [Vol. I 19:I168o
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could not participate. Nullifying Revels's election because the Four-
teenth Amendment had not sufficiently overcome Article I and Dred
Scott would thus limit black political participation on the say-so of an
exclusively white constitutional process, rather than by the authority of
a prior decision that blacks should have recognized as legitimately de-
mocratic. It cannot be the case, of course, that all constitutional doc-
trines rooted in pre-Civil War times are per se inapplicable to African
Americans. But in complex ways that Part II explores, considerations
of democratic legitimacy at a time of transition argued for allowing
electoral politics (in which blacks now participated) to revise inherited
constitutional rules that would otherwise have perpetuated black
exclusion.
In Part III, I use the interpretive principles that emerge from con-
sidering the Revels debate to criticize the Supreme Court's landmark
ruling in the Civil Rights Cases2 2 of 1883. In its opinion striking down
the Civil Rights Act of 1875,23 the Court confronted several of the
same issues that the Senate engaged in the Revels debate, but it re-
solved those issues differently. First, the Civil Rights Cases denied
that events of the Civil War era had worked a great constitutional
revolution. Second, the Civil Rights Cases rejected the use of national
electoral politics as a mechanism for vindicating an important set of
rights for African Americans, and it did so in the name of constitu-
tional principles inherited from a time when only whites could partici-
pate in making the rules. In so doing, and in marked contrast to the
Senate's action in seating Revels, the Court damaged American consti-
tutional law's claim to being a democratically legitimate form of au-
thority in cases adversely affecting African Americans.
I. RECOVERING REVELS
A. The Senate Confronts the Riddle
When Revels arrived in the Senate, the ceremonial honor of pre-
senting his credentials went to Senator Henry Wilson of Massachu-
setts, a Radical Republican and an outspoken advocate of racial equal-
ity.2 4  Senator Wilson surely relished the moment. "I present the
credentials," he declared, "of Hon[orable] H.R. Revels, Senator-elect
from Mississippi. '25 He did not add "and the first person of African
descent ever to serve in the Congress of the United States." Everyone
22 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
23 Ch. 114, i8 Stat. 335.
24 Three years later, Senator Wilson would become Vice President of the United States under
President Grant.
25 CONG. GLOBE, 4 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 1503 (1870).
1685200o6]
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in the chamber - everyone in the country, in fact, or at least everyone
who read newspapers - knew that part already 6
The Democrats objected immediately 7 In keeping with the Con-
stitution's provision that each house of Congress is the judge of the
qualifications of its own members, 28 their objections were addressed
internally rather than referred to a court or some other outside body.
During the three days of debate that followed, different Democrats ar-
ticulated different objections, some more subtle than others.2 9 What-
ever the credibility of their other arguments, however, the Senate's
Democrats had a reasonable point when they argued that Revels was
not eligible to sit because he was not yet nine years a citizen. Every-
one remembered Dred Scott. Everyone knew that the year was 1870,
and everyone knew that the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified
only in i868. Everyone could do the math.
Democrat George Vickers of Maryland conveyed the problem in a
measured and lawyerly way. He acknowledged that Dred Scott had
been widely denounced and was not much respected in the Senate of
1870. Still, he said, the law was the law, and politicians were not free
to disregard Supreme Court decisions merely because they disliked
them. 30  Senator Vickers then argued that the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of i866, which also pur-
ported to grant citizenship to blacks, showed that the Republicans un-
derstood Dred Scott to have been the law up until that time, because
otherwise the citizenship provisions of those new authorities would
have been redundant. 31 Neither the Civil Rights Act nor the Four-
teenth Amendment purported to operate retroactively, he noted, and
he reminded the Senate that as a general matter laws operate only pro-
spectively unless they expressly state otherwise.32 As a matter of sim-
ple and honest legal interpretation, Senator Vickers concluded, Revels
was not yet nine years a citizen. 33
Other Democrats took less nuanced positions. Senator Garrett
Davis of Kentucky invoked the authority of Dred Scott to declare that
Revels was not a citizen at all, even in I87o. 34 Far from conceding
26 See sources cited supra note i6 and accompanying text.
27 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1503 (1870).
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. I.
29 Naturally, some of the objections raised were petty and technical. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1503-04 0870) (dispute over whether the papers attesting to Revels's selec-
tion by the Mississippi legislature were signed by the proper state official). Most of the debate,
however, concerned the deeper constitutional question on which this Article focuses.
30 Id. at '557-58 (statement of Sen. Vickers).
31 Id. at I56o.
32 Id. at 1558.
33 See id. at 1557-60.
34 Id. at 15 io (statement of Sen. Davis).
1686 [Vol. i 19:I168o
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that Dred Scott had been overruled or superseded, Senator Davis
deemed that decision a shining tower of constitutional rectitude.
"[T]here is no human intellect, there is no legal learning that can over-
turn or shake the opinion of the Chief Justice in that case," he de-
clared.35  In his view, the American polity fundamentally excluded
people of African descent, and that was that. At the Founding, he re-
minded his colleagues, various laws held even free blacks far below the
status of citizens. 36 Given this history and the uncontestable truth of
Dred Scott, Senator Davis maintained that Revels could not then or
ever be a citizen, much less a senator.
37
One might wonder where the Fourteenth Amendment fit into Sena-
tor Davis's analysis. No matter what the law was before i868, a con-
stitutional amendment overruling Dred Scott and conferring citizen-
ship on all persons born in the United States should have altered the
prewar regime, unless the racial basis of American citizenship were
somehow so fundamental as to be unchangeable even through consti-
tutional amendment. Senator Davis did not address this matter di-
rectly, leaving implicit in his argument that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had no force to alter the prewar regime.
His colleague Senator Eli Saulsbury of Delaware addressed the
Fourteenth Amendment more directly. According to Senator Sauls-
bury, that Amendment was not a valid part of the Constitution at all.
38
He did not explain why the Fourteenth Amendment was invalid, so we
can only speculate about the theory behind his claim. One possibility
is that he regarded the Amendment as invalid because of procedural
irregularities in its ratification.39 Another, perhaps more in keeping
with Senator Davis's impulses, is that no amendment could have the
power to alter so fundamental a feature of the American polity as the
exclusion of people of African descent. Whatever Senator Saulsbury's
rationale, however, the basic contention was clear: Even in 187o, Dred
Scott stated the law of American citizenship. Hiram Revels was not a
citizen, let alone a citizen for nine years.
The Senate Republicans believed in the validity of the Fourteenth
Amendment, of course. They had no doubt that Revels was a citizen
on the day he arrived in the Senate chamber. More fundamentally,
many of them could not believe that anyone would stand up in the
35 Id. at 1509.
36 Id. at 1511-12.
37 See id. at 1509-12.
38 Id. app. at 127 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
39 See generally 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 99-120 (discussing "formalist dilemmas" em-
bedded in the history of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and noting that "the process
by which Congress procured ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment simply cannot be squared
with the text [of Article V]").
16872006]
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United States Senate in 187o and argue that Dred Scott had ever been
authoritative. "I never expected to hear read in the Senate of the
United States, or in any court of justice where authority was looked
for, the Dred Scott decision," said Senator James Nye of Nevada.40
Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan was less civil. He pronounced
himself "nauseated," disdaining entirely the thought of going "into that
recondite inquiry as to the political status of a black man under the
Dred Scott decision."41 Not to be outdone, Senator Charles Sumner of
Massachusetts declared that Dred Scott had been "[b]orn a putrid
corpse," and described it as "a stench in the nostrils ... to be remem-
bered only as a warning and a shame. '42
In a mirror image of the Democratic belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment had not validly overruled Dred Scott, many Republicans
believed that Dred Scott had no legal force even without the Four-
teenth Amendment. One can distinguish two forms of that belief. The
first, which might follow from Senator Sumner's description of Dred
Scott as "born a putrid corpse," is that Dred Scott was so wrong as to
have been invalid ab initio. The other, which is more complex concep-
tually but yields the same result, is that events following Dred Scott -
the election of President Lincoln, Southern secession, the Civil War,
emancipation, and perhaps the postwar constitutional amendments -
amounted to a radical break with the past, one that made it senseless
to treat certain legal authorities from the old regime as if they had con-
tinuing meaning. On this view, the Republican position might not be
that Revels had been a citizen for nine chronological years before 1870,
or at least not in a sense that could be confirmed by asking whether a
court in i86i would have deemed him a citizen. Instead, the position
would be that in 1870, it was impermissible to betray fundamental
principles of the new order by giving legal effect to the fact that other
principles - evil principles - had been applied at an earlier time.
Whatever people might have done in 1857 or i86i, this perspective
would hold, it would violate the norms of 187o to give continuing force
to Dred Scott.
Although not always clearly distinguishing between those two posi-
tions, several Republicans argued that the Civil War itself demon-
strated Dred Scott's invalidity. "The comment made upon that great
wrongful judicial decision is to be seen in the dreadful war through
which we have passed," said Senator Howard.43 Senator Frederick
Sawyer, a transplanted Bostonian representing South Carolina, spoke
of the war as "the great court of errors" that had reversed the Taney
40 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1513 (1870) (statement of Sen. Nye).
41 Id. at 1543 (statement of Sen. Howard).
42 Id. at 1566-67 (statement of Sen. Sumner).
43 Id. at 1543 (statement of Sen. Howard).
1688 [Vol. I 9:Ii680
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Court's judgment.4 4 Senator Nye said that Dred Scott had been "re-
pealed by the mightiest uprising which the world has ever witnessed"
and regarded the Democrats in this debate as attempting - patheti-
cally, perhaps - to stand in the shoes of the defeated Confederate ar-
mies.45 He described the effort to bar Revels from the Senate as Sena-
tor Davis's "last battle-field," noting: "It is the last opportunity he will
have to make this fight .... He has been fighting it boldly, and he feels
as Lee felt and as [Jefferson] Davis felt when Grant swung his army
around Richmond. 4 6
Some of these statements - Senator Howard's, for example -
could reflect either the view that Dred Scott was invalid ab initio or
the view that the war, or the war in combination with other events af-
ter 1857, rendered the Supreme Court's judgment null retroactively.
Individual senators did not always differentiate between the two theo-
ries, and there is no reason to think that each Republican senator's
thoughts on the issue fit neatly in one category or the other. What is
clear, however, is that these Republican senators did not consider Dred
Scott a constitutional authority that had been displaced only when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in i868.
For three days, the Senate debated the status of Dred Scott and the
qualifications of Hiram Revels. The public was riveted. According to
a reporter observing the scene, "[t]here was not an inch of standing or
sitting room in the galleries ... and to say that the interest was intense
gives but a faint idea of the feeling which prevailed throughout the en-
tire proceeding. 47  On more than one occasion there were outbursts
and demonstrations from the spectators and the Vice President had to
call for order.4
Finally, on Friday, February 25, the Senate called the question.
Forty-eight senators, all Republicans, voted in favor of administering
the oath of office to Hiram Revels. 49 Eight senators, all Democrats,
voted against. 50 The Vice President duly called Revels to the front of
the chamber to take the oath of office. 5' Hiram Revels, Republican of
Mississippi, then and there became a United States senator by swear-
ing to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic. S2
44 Id. at 1564 (statement of Sen. Sawyer).
45 Id. at 1513 (statement of Sen. Nye).
46 Id.
47 Colored Member, supra note 17.
48 CONG. GLOBE, 4 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 1568 (1870); see also Colored Member, supra note I7.
49 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1568 (1870).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See Appendix (containing Revels's oath of office).
1689200,6]
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One wonders who Revels had in mind as the Constitution's ene-
mies as he stood in the well of the chamber. More subtly, one wonders
how to understand the content of his oath. He swore to support and
defend the Constitution, but what was the Constitution at the moment
when he swore? The preceding debate reflected radical disagreement
within the Senate about even the basic fact of what texts the Constitu-
tion contained, let alone what the Constitution meant or to what val-
ues or vision of government it was committed. At the very least, the
Senate was debating the content and meaning of the Constitution
when it debated Revels's qualifications. What was the Constitution's
position on racial equality, and what was the constitutional signifi-
cance of the war? The decision to seat Revels was, among other
things, a bid to shape authoritative answers to those questions.
B. The Revels Debate as Constitutional Interpretation
Characterizing the Revels affair as a constitutional debate entails
three propositions that are worth developing. The first is that nonju-
dicial actors engage in constitutional interpretation. The second is that
the debating senators articulated an authentic dispute about issues of
principle, rather than merely advancing whatever arguments sup-
ported their desired outcome in the matter before them. The third
proposition is that the issues before the Senate were constitutional is-
sues. Together, these three propositions establish that the Revels de-
bate was an exercise in constitutional interpretation - or perhaps in
constitutional construction.
i. Nonjudicial Constitutionalism. - It is important, although per-
haps no longer as necessary as it once was, to be clear that constitu-
tional debate and interpretation occur outside as well as inside of
courts. 5 3 Courts themselves have long recognized that other branches
must at least share in the process of constitutional interpretation and,
moreover, that the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors are often
entitled to judicial deference.54 To take an easy example, a congres-
sional determination that some federal officer's conduct constitutes
impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors under Article II, Section 4
is a constitutional judgment. Many would take the view that a con-
gressional determination that the Family and Medical Leave Act of
53 See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS
OF WAR AND PEACE (2005) (arguing that the Executive Branch can engage in unfettered inter-
pretation of the Constitution in much of foreign affairs).
54 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S 507, 535-36 (1997) (acknowledging that Congress
is presumed to consider questions of constitutionality when it acts and that Congress's constitu-
tional judgment is entitled to respect, even when still subject to judicial review).
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199355 is an appropriate means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is also a constitutional judgment, even if many who took that
view would also say that Congress's interpretation was subject to judi-
cial review. 56 Although the proper allocation of interpretive authority
among judicial and nonjudicial actors remains a contested question,57
it is certainly the case that some nonjudicial activities call for constitu-
tional interpretation. Accordingly, the fact that the Revels debate oc-
curred in the Senate rather than in a court does not preclude it from
being properly classified as a constitutional debate.
To be sure, readers who acknowledge that the Senate can in princi-
ple engage in constitutional interpretation might be skeptical about
whether the Revels affair was in practice such an exercise. Two dif-
ferent intuitions might underlie that objection: that the Revels affair
was a cynical political exercise rather than an authentic clash of prin-
ciples, or that it was an authentic debate about nonconstitutional
ideas. As the remainder of this section explains, however, neither of
these intuitions should withstand scrutiny: the contest over Revels was
a constitutional debate in the deepest sense.
2. Politics and Principles. - Revels was a Republican. The Re-
publicans wanted to seat him, and the Democrats did not. The matter
was decided on a party-line vote. Observers who approach legislative
debate through certain assumptions of twentieth- or twenty-first-
century political culture might accordingly suspect that the fight over
Revels's qualifications was not a conflict between constitutional vi-
sions but merely a matter of partisanship, with each side espousing
whatever makeweight arguments supported its preferred result. And
to be sure, the debate was not entirely free of either partisanship or
disingenuity. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to understand the Revels
debate as merely sound and fury signifying normal politics. Indeed,
the Revels debate makes little sense if one assumes that at root both
sides were trying to achieve a local result rather than to vindicate a
larger principle.
As a practical matter, the outcome of the Revels affair was never in
doubt. The Republicans held an overwhelming majority in the cham-
ber. The Democrats had no hope of blocking Revels, and they knew
it.58 And yet, the Democrats opposed him vociferously for three days
55 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 26Ol-2654 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
56 See Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728, 740 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legis-
lative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2045-48 (2003).
57 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (describing "Protes-
tant" and "Catholic" approaches to the question of which institutions have the authority to inter-
pret the Constitution).
58 Senator Davis acknowledged before making his major arguments that anything he said
would be "ineffectual." CONG. GLOBE, 4 Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 1509 (1870) (statement of Sen.
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on the Senate floor. It follows that for the senators present or for the
constituencies they represented - and probably for both - something
beyond the practical result must have been at issue. That larger some-
thing was worth fighting for, at length and on the record, even though
the outcome of this particular round of the struggle was preordained.
This is not to say that partisan considerations played no part in the
debate, nor is it to claim that every argument offered was made in
good faith.59 It cannot be the case, however, that a debate must traffic
only in pure principled argument to qualify as constitutional interpre-
tation, or else the number of instances in which even the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Constitution would be vanishingly small.
Fifty-six senators, like nine Justices, are likely to decide a contested
question for some combination of partisan, personal, and principled
reasons rather than with any one kind of reasoning alone. At the ex-
treme, when principled constitutional reasoning accounts for nearly
none of the motive force behind a decision, we might say that no au-
thentic constitutional interpretation had occurred, even if the decision
purported to concern a constitutional issue. But when decisionmakers
acting in good faith argue for their views largely or chiefly on princi-
pled grounds, the decisionmaking process can be an authentic act of
constitutional interpretation even if other kinds of considerations are
also in play. Chief Justice John Marshall may well have wanted to
preserve Federalist Party power in the judiciary when he decided
Marbury v. Madison,60 but Marbury is still an act of constitutional in-
terpretation. 61 Thus, the claim that the Revels affair was sufficiently
principled to qualify as an exercise in interpreting the Constitution
means that the Senate debate was not only or predominantly a matter
of politicians advancing whatever arguments suited their partisan
advantage.
Different participants in the debate would have characterized the
content of the larger principle in different ways, but two themes pre-
dominated. One was whether and in what respect blacks were the
equals of whites. The other was the significance of the war, and in
particular whether a new political order had swept away the antebel-
Davis). Senator Saulsbury described himself as "attempting to prevent that which is already a
certainty." Id. app. at 125 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
59 One Democratic senator candidly announced his intention to object as often as possible and
on any conceivable ground. See id. at I5o8 (statement of Sen. Davis). In light of the practical
futility of opposition, however, it seems likely that even a decision to impose petty objections
whenever they could be raised stemmed from the view that something enormous was at stake.
60 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (18o3).
61 A purist might retort that Marbury is not authentic constitutional interpretation either. But
if Marbury does not count as constitutional interpretation, then the going criteria for what counts
as constitutional interpretation are too demanding for "constitutional interpretation" to be a
meaningful category of real-world activity.
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lum constitutional regime. The two issues were interrelated. Indeed,
it is not clear that they could always be distinguished.
Much of the opposition to Revels was starkly racist. Outside the
chamber, Democratic newspapers set a vicious tone: the New York
World decried the arrival of a "lineal descendant of an ourang-otang in
Congress" and added that Revels had "hands resembling claws. 62
The discourse inside the chamber was almost equally pointed. Senator
Davis asked rhetorically whether any of the Republicans present who
claimed willingness to accept Revels as a colleague "has made sedulous
court to any one fair black swan, and offered to take her singing to the
altar of Hymen. '63  Senator Saulsbury baited his Republican col-
leagues, speaking of "the tender sensibilities of a majority of the mem-
bers of this body" who were "fondly... attached to the negro race,"
and adding, "I know how dearly you love it.' '64 Further assailing the
Republicans' motives and indeed their states of mind, he wondered
aloud at the great "anxiety which you all display for the
... admission.., of this negro or mulatto man. '65 A Republican sena-
tor tried to lighten the mood by teasing Senator Saulsbury, interrupting
to say that Revels was in fact neither negro nor mulatto but "an octo-
roon, if that will make any difference in [the Senator's] argument. 66
The Congressional Globe recorded laughter in the chamber,67 and even
Senator Saulsbury - as a good politician with an audience - was
willing to indulge the moment as humorous. 68 Nonetheless, he re-
garded the underlying issue with deadly seriousness. To Senator
Saulsbury, the seating of a negro or even an octoroon senator was a
"great calamity" and a "great and damning outrage" that left him with
"but little hope for the future of [the] country. '69
One Republican senator - George Williams of Oregon - tried to
turn the facts underlying this joke into a legal basis for finessing the
constitutional issue. At different times in his life, Revels was called a
quadroon, an octoroon, and a Croatan Indian as well as a negro,70 the
multiplicity of designations suggesting the hazards of trying to quan-
tify and categorize precise forms of racial mixing. Wherever his fore-
62 Sensation in the Senate, WORLD (N.Y.), Mar. i7, 1870, at i.
63 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 14 (1870) (statement of Sen. Davis).
64 Id. app. at 126 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
65 Id.
66 Id. (statement of Sen. Drake).
67 Id.
68 Id. (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) (mocking Senator Drake's observation).
69 Id. app. at 130.
70 See JULIUS ERIC THOMPSON, HIRAM R. REVELS, 1827-1901, at 8 (1982); Hiram R. Rev-
els, U.S. Senator Elect from Mississippi, FRANK LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER, Feb.
26, 187o, at 401 (describing Revels as "about three-fourths white"). In his autobiography, Revels
referred to himself as "Negro" and as "colored." See Hiram R. Revels, Autobiography 2, 3 (n.d.)
(unpublished handwritten manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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bears had lived, however, and in whatever proportions, Revels was
light skinned and generally understood to have had more European
ancestors than African ones. Accordingly, Senator Williams argued,
the citizenship bar of Dred Scott should not apply to Revels even if the
case were authoritative when applicable, because Dred Scott should be
read to apply only to persons of "pure African blood."'7'
This attempt to settle the issue without confronting the hard consti-
tutional question had a legal pedigree, albeit one that Senator Williams
did not mention. Eight years earlier, the Attorney General of the
United States had proffered the same reading of Dred Scott.72 In a
proceeding that turned on whether a colored man was an American
citizen, Attorney General Edward Bates admitted arguendo the au-
thority of Dred Scott but officially opined that its holding, in light of a
strict construction of the pleadings in that case, applied only to people
of unmixed African descent.73 Free people of mixed racial ancestry, he
said, were citizens of the United States if born on American soil.
74
This position amounted to a one-drop rule in reverse: any non-African
ancestry would remove a person from the bar of Dred Scott. Revels
surely qualified for citizenship under that standard.
But what was good enough for the Lincoln Administration in 1862
was decidedly not good enough for the Senate in 1870. Senator Wil-
liams's tack garnered no support from senators of either party, and in-
deed some Republicans expressly repudiated it as an unacceptable and
perhaps cowardly dodge. Senator William Stewart, for one, immedi-
ately intervened to say that the Senate should not distinguish Dred
Scott but should instead make clear that it was "overruling the Dred
Scott decision."75 Senator Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania found the
suggested compromise a bit repulsive and took the opportunity to de-
liver a short sermon on the subject of transracial brotherhood. 76 Sena-
tor Cameron had not participated in the debate at all to that point and
said he would have continued to keep out of the discussion had Sena-
tor Williams not "got up to make an argument that this man has more
of white than of black blood in his veins. What do I care which pre-
71 CONG. GLOBE, 4 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 1543 (1870) (statement of Sen. Williams).
72 See io Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 412 (1862).
73 See id. at 409-13.
74 Id. at 412-13. The incident prompting Bates to write this letter involved a law requiring
the masters of ships plying the coasting trade to be United States citizens. Acting under that law,
a revenue cutter detained a merchant shipmaster at sea because he was colored (in this case, of
mixed African and European ancestry) and therefore perhaps not a citizen. The Treasury De-
partment asked the Attorney General whether such a person could be a citizen and therefore a
legal shipmaster in the coasting trade. John Witt has encouraged me to regard this incident as an
early example of arrest for driving while black.
75 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1543 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
76 Id. at 1544 (statement of Sen. Cameron).
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ponderates? He is a man... .,77 Perhaps more than that, Senator
Cameron continued, "his race, when the country was in its peril, came
to the rescue. ' '78 And then, in an admirable concession of his own fal-
libility, Senator Cameron acknowledged that his own views about race
and equality had changed in the course of his lifetime: "I admit that it
somewhat shocks my old prejudices, as it probably does the prejudices
of many more here, that one of the despised race should come here to
be my equal; but I look upon it as the act of God. '79
In addition to being a fight about race, the debate over Hiram
Revels was a fight about the significance of the Civil War. In particu-
lar, it was a fight about the extent to which a new regime had super-
seded the Constitution of 1787. Like the issue of racial equality, this
issue of constitutional transition was contested at a high level of prin-
ciple rather than merely as a means for seating or blocking Hiram
Revels.
The Republican position entailed more than the belief that the
Fourteenth Amendment - or some other comparable force - had re-
jected Dred Scott. It entailed the belief that Dred Scott should be
given no recognition at all, not even the recognition that it had been
the law nine years earlier. Accordingly, Republicans addressing the
Revels controversy spoke not just of technical points of law, but also of
grand, tectonic constitutional shifts, depicting 187o as a world made
wholly new. Senator Nye, for example, acknowledged that the treat-
ment of blacks in America had historically been abysmal but insisted
that the past had been wiped away: "[T]hat reign of wrong is over, and
the reign of right and righteousness has taken its place."80 Taking
stock of the magnitude of the constitutional change, Senator Charles
Drake of Missouri prophesied that if people would understand the full
importance of the Reconstruction Amendments, "gentlemen on the
other side will find that there is a Constitution there such as they
never dreamed of."'81 From this perspective, relying on Dred Scott was
a pathetic attempt to hold on to a bygone past, and an unhappy past
at that.
But to the Democrats, standing firm for the old Constitution was a
noble act. Senator Saulsbury insisted that the Constitution was
"framed by [the people's] worthy and patriotic sires, and ... intended
7 7 Id.
78 Id. It is worth noting an internal tension in Senator Cameron's pronouncements, one that
has beset many subsequent liberal arguments about race: Senator Cameron regarded Revels as a
man rather than a person with a given proportion of white or black blood, but he still recognized
Revels's racial identity in order to speak of Revels's race coming to the rescue in the Civil War.
79 Id. Senator Cameron, who as Lincoln's Secretary of War had been Bates's colleague from
I86i to 1862, had initially entered the Senate as a Democrat.
80 Id. at 513 (statement of Sen. Nye).
81 Id. at 1564 (statement of Sen. Drake).
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to be a rich and noble heritage to them and their posterity forever. 82
He wished to preserve that "proud heritage, bequeathed to us by our
noble ancestors as they intended it to be preserved. '83  By their
"alarming innovations," he charged, the Republicans were turning
their backs on the Constitution, seeking to make America "more com-
pletely revolutionized than was this country by the separation of the
Colonies from Great Britain."84  In doing so, they were betraying the
true Constitution of the United States.
The predominant Republican attitude regarding how to respond to
the Democrats demonstrates that most Republican senators also re-
garded these issues as matters of principle rather than as debates to be
won with whatever tools presented themselves. A few times during
the debate, individual Republican senators suggested technical solu-
tions to the nine-year problem. Senator Williams's attempt to reclas-
sify Revels as mostly white and therefore not within the ambit of Dred
Scott was one such attempt.8 5 Senator Stewart offered another, argu-
ing that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prop-
erly read, was intended to relate back to birth.8 6 On this account, lan-
guage conferring citizenship on "[a]ll persons born ... in the United
States" '8 7 implicitly conferred that citizenship as of the time of birth,
even if that time preceded the date of the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification. Senator John Scott of Pennsylvania tried a third tech-
nique, suggesting that the nine-year citizenship requirement should not
apply to Revels at all. 8 The point of the nine-year requirement, he
said, was to prevent foreign influence, which was of no moment in
Revels's case.8 9 Even if Revels had not been a citizen for nine years,
he had never been loyal to a foreign state, either.90 These three sena-
tors used three conventional modes of legal argument - facts, text,
82 Id. app. at 127 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
83 Id. app. at 130.
84 Id. app. at 127.
85 See supra pp. 1694-95.
86 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1566 (1870) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
88 Id. at 1565 (statement of Sen. Scott).
89 Id.
90 Id. Senator Scott supported this argument by pointing out that the nine-year rule had his-
torically been flexible when there was no worry about foreign influence. When Texas was admit-
ted to the Union, he noted, Texan senators were immediately seated, despite the fact that they had
been citizens of the Republic of Texas and not of the United States immediately before admission.
Id. It would not have been difficult, however, to rebut Scott's point about the Texans by keeping
to the same kind of strict reading of the nine-year clause that the Democrats' argument implied
throughout. The first Texan senators had uncontroversially been United States citizens for the
many years between their births within the United States and their migration to Texas as adults.
See id. at 1566. Thus, even if they were not citizens for the nine years immediately preceding
their election to the Senate, they had still at some point been American citizens for nine years.
For the possible application of this wrinkle to Revels, see infra note 107.
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and policy - in search of a technical solution. There are reasonable
arguments, perhaps even strong ones, for the proposition that none of
these arguments succeeds as a strict matter of legal craft.9' Nonethe-
less, these technical arguments or others that one could invent 92 might
support (or at least rationalize) admitting Revels to the Senate, thus al-
lowing the Republicans to reach their desired result without having to
invoke more extreme positions about a rupture in constitutional
history.
It is noteworthy, therefore, that these attempts at lawyerly solutions
attracted almost no support. No Republican senators expressed enthu-
siasm for the clever readings of the Citizenship Clause or the nine-year
rule that would have justified seating Revels, and the idea of winning
the argument by playing with the racial categories and declaring him
not black earned active opprobrium. Instead, the dominant Republi-
can impulse was to deny any compromise that accommodated the con-
trary authority of the old regime. In other words, the Republicans did
not simply seek a way to justify seating Revels. They wanted the ad-
mission of Revels to stand for a set of larger principles.
3. What Makes Principles "Constitutional"? - The real issues in
the Revels debate had little to do with textual interpretation. Plainly,
what divided the parties so bitterly was not whether relevant canons
91 The argument that Revels was not within the bar of Dred Scott because he was not of full
African blood had some technical plausibility in light of the stipulated facts of that case: Scott was
identified as a negro of full African blood, and Chief Justice Taney's opinion could be read to ap-
ply only to cases on all fours with the one before the Court. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S.
(i 9 How.) 393, 400 (1857). Nonetheless, this would be an idiosyncratic reading, especially in light
of dominant cultural practices that regarded persons of mixed ancestry as subject to the legal re-
gimes applicable to black people rather than those applicable to white people. See, e.g., Ariela J.
Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, xo8
YALE L.J. 109, 177-78 (1998) (stating that before the Civil War most states treated persons with
one-fourth to one-eighth black ancestry as black, and after the war many states moved toward
"one-drop" rules under which even less black ancestry would classify a person as black). The ar-
gument that the language of the Citizenship Clause relates back to birth is essentially an argu-
ment for retroactive application, and although the point is contestable, much nineteenth-century
authority supported the Democrats' contention that, as a default rule, legal enactments were not
read to be retroactive unless they specifically said otherwise. Indeed, shortly after the Revels de-
bate the Supreme Court gave effect to that rule by twice expressly refusing to give retroactive ef-
fect to another Reconstruction Amendment: the Thirteenth. See infra note ii i and accompany-
ing text. Finally, although it seems reasonable to interpret the nine-year rule as intended to bar
foreign influence, the language of Article I, Section 3 - "No Person shall be a Senator who shall
not have ... been nine Years a Citizen of the United States" - does not contemplate exceptions.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. Moreover, one could adduce a policy rationale for applying the
nine-year rule to all new citizens, whether formerly foreigners or not: perhaps the nine-year rule
would have the salutary effect of providing a period of time during which the would-be senator
could participate in the polity, learning its norms and values before becoming eligible to hold
high office. Such a period of education and experience could be valuable irrespective of the dan-
ger of foreign influence.
92 For suggestions, see infra section H.A.
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of construction indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizen-
ship Clause should or should not be read to have retroactive force.
Indeed, if the controversy had centered on such technical issues, the
strict party-line vote would bespeak a great deal of disingenuousness
in the Senate, because there is no reason to think that party affiliations
would cleanly map so many people's views about a relatively abstract
interpretive issue. The natural inference would be that the senators
cared little about that interpretive issue and simply endorsed whatever
position conduced to their preferred results. In the main, however, the
senators who clashed over Revels did not pretend that they were fight-
ing about canons of interpretation, and they did not focus their argu-
ments on the text of the written Constitution. Nonetheless, their prin-
cipal contentions were constitutional arguments. And indeed, the
partisan division of the Senate reflected the constitutional nature of the
conflict.
On a properly rich understanding, the subject of American consti-
tutional inquiry is not a written document alone, or that document and
its judicial glosses, but the fundamental set of ideas, practices, and
values that shape the workings of legitimate American government.
Nobody can accurately describe the full content of that set. The
boundaries of the constitutional are contestable, both in the sense that
there will always be disagreement about what governmental actions
are permitted and in the sense that there will always be disagreement
about which issues are of sufficient importance to the functioning of
government to be classified as "constitutional." Thus, reasonable peo-
ple can argue both about whether the War Powers Resolution 93 is con-
stitutional in the sense of being a permissible exercise of legislative au-
thority and about whether the War Powers Resolution is constitutional
in the sense of having more than merely statutory dimension. (In the
first sense, "constitutional" is opposed to unconstitutional; in the sec-
ond sense, "constitutional" is opposed to nonconstitutional.) That said,
there are also significant areas of consensus. More or less everyone
agrees that Congress may constitutionally prescribe wage and hour
rules for interstate truckers, and more or less everyone agrees that
whether a state may use racial criteria when hiring contractors poses a
constitutional question. Because the written Constitution addresses
many fundamental aspects of American government and frequently
does so in general terms, it is contingently (and not coincidently) true
that most constitutional issues bear some relationship to passages in
the written Constitution. But such a relationship to the text is not, I
contend, the criterion by virtue of which an issue is constitutional.
93 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
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What makes an issue constitutional is its substantively important place
in American governance.
On this understanding, both of the central issues in the Revels de-
bate were constitutional matters. Whatever the senators may have
thought about the proper canons for reading the Citizenship Clause,
the question of whether and to what extent a civil war has swept away
the authority of the prior regime is as fundamental an issue about gov-
ernment as any decisionmaker is likely to confront. Similarly, whether
black persons can be senators goes directly to the way in which
American political power can be exercised. Given the importance of
officeholding and the salience of race in American life, any answer to
that question would have ramifications for the system of governance.
Indeed, whether blacks could be senators would have been a constitu-
tional question before as well as after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment. At any time in American history, any answer to that
question would have relied on a theory about the nature of the Repub-
lic and its political processes - that is, a constitutional theory. And
given the political culture of 1870, it is entirely natural that a constitu-
tional debate in this deeper sense would have broken down along
party lines, even if most senators voted their principles rather than
merely their partisanship. At the height of Reconstruction, there was
little question that senators' party affiliations mapped a deep differ-
ence in views about the values and workings of American
government. 94
94 Thinking about this phenomenon may be easier if one recognizes the party dynamics of the
Reconstruction Congress as being more like those of antebellum America than those of more
modem times. As is well known, leading American politicians in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries largely subscribed to a theory on which political parties were undesirable institu-
tions. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 40-121 (1969). During
the time of what are generally called the First and Second Party Systems (that is, to simplify
slightly, the competition between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans from the 1790s to the
i8ios and then the competition between Democrats and Whigs from the 183Os to the 185os),
thinkers on each side of the political divide were likely to think of the opposing party less as a
legitimate alternative within the constitutional system than as a threat to that system itself.
Rather than expecting the two parties to take turns governing throughout the foreseeable future,
many early-nineteenth century Americans looked forward to the destruction of all parties but
their own (which was not really a party at all, they might say, but an anti-party effort to save the
Republic) and the restoration of nonpartisan politics within the proper constitutional framework.
See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS 14-17 (2002) (characterizing
the conflict between Democrats and Whigs as less a disagreement over policies than "a battle over
the question of party itself and its relationship to the Constitution, neither party ever fully accept-
ing the constitutional legitimacy of the other"). Such an expectation would seem naive today, but
it was surely more plausible during the middle of the nineteenth century; after all, the Democ-
ratic-Republicans had only recently ended the First Party System by utterly routing the Federal-
ists. And given the substantial correspondence between party affiliation and geographical section
in the I85os and i86os, the crisis precipitating the Civil War naturally encouraged many party
politicians in the first years of the Third Party System - that is, the system of Republicans and
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Finally, it is worth noting that the two constitutional issues at the
heart of the Revels debate were largely inextricable from each other.
Rather than confronting a question of legal transition that happened to
coincide with a question of racial equality, there was an important
sense in which the Senate faced a single overriding conflict. The De-
mocrats were surely sincere in feeling that the constitutional issue at
stake was rife with tradition and history and other things not collapsi-
ble to a simple question about race. It is not clear, however, how
much life or content the issue of constitutional revolution had for them
independent of their concern with white supremacy. At the very least,
the two issues were pervasively intertwined. The substance of the in-
novation that so exercised senators like Saulsbury and Davis was
about race. If a new order would repudiate the old one, the key ele-
ment of that repudiation would concern the old regime's sanction of
slavery, caste distinction, and other official disadvantages visited upon
black Americans. Their chief concern was to preserve the prewar ra-
cial hierarchy to the greatest extent possible, even after the Recon-
struction Amendments.
95
One of the most telling moments in the three days of debate oc-
curred when the Republican Stewart pressed the Democrat Vickers to
expand on his view of Revels's ineligibility. Senator Vickers had ar-
ticulated the Democratic position in moderate terms. He called on the
Senate to decide the question through judicious deliberation rather
than political will; 96 he argued that Dred Scott, no matter what one
thought of its merits, was the positive law until overturned; 97 and he
maintained that as a legal matter the Fourteenth Amendment had no
retroactive application.98  Perhaps curious as to how far this Democ-
rat's reasonableness would extend, Senator Stewart asked him an ob-
vious question. Suppose, he inquired, the situation were to arise at a
later time, after nine years had passed from ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Then would Senator Vickers vote to admit a col-
ored man to the Senate?99
Democrats - to continue seeing the other major party less as a legitimate alternative than as a
constitutional antagonist. See id. at 16-17. In 1870, that rift was far from healed.
95 Not coincidentally, no senator of either party articulated conflicting views on the issues of
race and revolution. Nobody argued that Africans were tainted lower beings but that as a matter
of the proper understanding of the constitutional regime, they were now eligible to sit in the Sen-
ate. Conversely, nobody argued that every man was the equal of every other, regardless of race,
but that the positive law simply did not permit Revels to be a citizen or a senator.
96 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d. Sess. i56o (1870) (statement of Sen. Vickers) ("This is not a
political but a judicial question, and ought to be decided by us as judges and not as politicians.").
97 See id. at 1557.
98 Id. at 1558.
99 Id. at i56i (statement of Sen. Stewart).
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Senator Vickers did not answer. Instead, he said that he had not
heard the question and wished for it to be repeated to him. 100 (As one
who asks hypothetical questions for a living, I have some sense of
what motivates a questioned party to ask that a question be repeated.)
Senator Stewart obliged, repeating the question: would Senator Vickers
vote to admit a duly elected colored man to the Senate, supposing that
enough time had elapsed that the nine-year issue were no longer ger-
mane?' 0 ' Once again, Senator Vickers did not answer. Instead, he
dodged and parried and perhaps grew indignant, although we cannot
know in what tone of voice he gave this response:
I shall have to be a little like a Yankee, and answer that question by ask-
ing another. Does the Senator consider that question any illustration of a
constitutional argument? Is an answer to that question one way or the
other to enlighten the judgment of this Senate in determining what is con-
stitutional or not?102
We all know exactly what Senator Stewart's question was supposed
to illustrate. He wanted to establish whether the Democrats' conten-
tion about the legal force of Dred Scott could be severed from their
view that persons of African descent could not be United States sena-
tors. If the two positions were separable, then the Democrats should
be prepared to concede that the racial issue would not be relevant nine
years after i868. If the Democrats were unwilling to commit to that
resolution, then their legal-constitutional stance regarding the rele-
vance of Dred Scott in 1870 must be bound up with the substance of
their racial views.
It need not follow that the Democrats were not in good faith about
their constitutional theory. More probably, their unwillingness to say
that a black man could be a senator if he satisfied the nine-year re-
quirement would mean that the Democrats' constitutional theory and
their racial theory were in fact the same, or at least substantially inter-
dependent. In other words, it would mean that the Democrats saw
white officeholding as a constitutional principle, a fundamental aspect
100 Id. (statement of Sen. Vickers).
101 Id. (statement of Sen. Stewart).
102 Id. (statement of Sen. Vickers). One other Democrat was willing to meet Senator Stewart's
challenge. Perhaps sensing that Senator Vickers's dodge would undermine his party's claim to be
making good-faith constitutional arguments, Senator Stockton of New Jersey subsequently ad-
dressed Senator Stewart's query and said that if a state "prefers a negro to represent her, I have
no right to call it in question," so long as that negro "is a citizen, and is eligible." Id. (statement of
Sen. Stockton). Even this position left Senator Stockton some wiggle room: after all, he did not
specifically acknowledge that a negro could ever be a citizen, and the debate that week showed
that Democrats might not take that point for granted. Nonetheless, a charitable reading would
construe Senator Stockton as having met Senator Stewart's challenge by answering that yes, seven
years later a black man could sit in the Senate.
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of American government. Their vision of Dred Scott and Hiram Rev-
els would make perfect sense on that understanding.
Senator Vickers refused to decouple the issues. Every senator in
the chamber must have known what that meant.
II. WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM REVELS
At one level, the Revels debate concerned a discrete legal question
about one man's qualifications for a particular office. And as this Part
shows, the Senate could have settled the issue either for or against
Revels on technical and lawyerly grounds. As both the content of the
Senate's conversation and the intense national attention paid to the af-
fair indicate, however, much larger things were at stake. In keeping
with that deeper reality, the Senate conducted the debate mostly at the
level of broad principles. Moreover, the sense that a technical and
lawyerly solution to the Revels problem would be unsatisfying or even
disingenuous is one that most twenty-first-century Americans are
likely to share with their nineteenth-century predecessors. Almost all
modern Americans will take the view that, as a bottom-line matter,
Revels should have been seated. 10 3 And if we are properly self-aware,
we will recognize that this view derives from normative constitutional
principles rather than from whatever technical legalisms we can de-
velop to "solve" the problem.
This Part analyzes two deeper and potentially more satisfying justi-
fications for seating Revels. The first is that the Civil War and Recon-
struction nullified antebellum legal authority limiting the rights of
African Americans to a greater extent than was codified in the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The second is that
once black men were recognized as equal participants in the American
polity, the legitimacy of the (amended) Constitution rested less on its
"democratic" pedigree and more on other considerations, including
substantive justice and the subjective identification of citizens with the
regime - factors that would be enhanced by seating Revels and viti-
ated by barring him. I will call the first hypothesis the "race and revo-
lution" idea and the second hypothesis the "transitional justice" idea.
If we wish to make sense of why we think Revels should have been
seated, I suggest, we must endorse at least one of these two hypotheses.
I offer these ideas primarily as principles of constitutional interpre-
tation that can enable modern Americans to make sense of Revels
rather than as a historical account of why the Senate acted as it did in
187o. That said, examining the relevant history yields significant sup-
port for both ideas. Historical inquiry is especially valuable for the
103 I have posed the question to more than three hundred students and colleagues, and not one
of them has maintained that Revels should not have been allowed to serve as a senator.
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race and revolution idea, which relies heavily on the premise that his-
torical events are sources of constitutional authority, and also depends
on a certain interpretation of events. Although the transitional justice
idea relies more on theoretical considerations of democratic value, his-
tory is still pertinent to evaluating it because historical experience illus-
trates the practical force of those theoretical considerations. Accord-
ingly, historical analysis is important to the development of each idea,
but the two occupy different conceptual spaces. The two ideas are not
mutually exclusive: one can accept either, both, or neither. Any of
those choices, however, has implications for how the Constitution
should be interpreted. Readers who accept either or both of these hy-
potheses endorse principles of constitutional interpretation that they
should also apply in other cases, as Part III shows. And readers who
reject both may have a difficult time justifying the decision to seat
Revels in the Senate.
Section A of this Part demonstrates the possibility and the poverty
of disposing of the Revels question on narrow or technical grounds.
Sections B and C then articulate, respectively, the deeper ideas about
race and revolution and about transitional justice that would better
justify the intuition - surely held by most present readers as well as
the 187o Republicans - that the Senate was right to seat Hiram
Revels.
A. Legalisms and Larger Principles
Like the senators of 1870, most modern Americans who learn of the
Revels controversy will probably form their views about the correct-
ness of seating Revels on some basis other than a close analysis of the
technical legal problem. Instead, present-day Americans are likely
first to applaud the decision that the 1870 Senate reached and then, if
they are of lawyerly casts of mind, to strive and strain to produce a
plausible legal argument justifying that outcome. Because clever con-
stitutional lawyers can find ways of reaching almost any result in cases
not wholly disposed of by precedent,1 0 4 it should be possible to develop
such arguments. And indeed it is. Here are three examples, none of
which was articulated by the Senate Republicans in 1870.
i. Departmentalism. - Consider an approach under which the
Supreme Court has the authority to define "citizen" for the purposes of
Article III, but Congress has independent authority to define "citizen"
for the purposes of Article I. This approach could leave Dred Scott in-
tact and still enable the Senate to seat Revels. While the Dred Scott
104 See Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Farce, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES I8o, 18o-83 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford
Levinson eds., 1998).
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citizenship issue arose from the Article III requirement of citizenship
for diversity jurisdiction in federal court,10 5 Revels's citizenship status
was an Article I question concerning his qualifications to be a
senator. 
0 6
2. Institutional Substitution. - This argument is related to the
above approach, although it is less strictly departmentalist. Perhaps
the Senate's constitutional power to determine the qualifications of its
own members placed it in a position analogous to that of the Supreme
Court when deciding to overrule a prior decision. If, counterfactually,
the Supreme Court had settled the Revels question, then perhaps it
would have overruled Dred Scott in a way that permitted Revels to sit
but did not assert that the Civil War or the Reconstruction Amend-
ments transformed the constitutional system. For example, the Court
could have ruled that Dred Scott was wrong the day it was decided as
a matter of "ordinary" constitutional interpretation, perhaps because of
errors in the Taney Court's understanding of founding intent or the
history of the early Republic. Because there was no possibility of ad-
judication in the Supreme Court, the Senate had to assume the role of
final constitutional adjudicator, and in that role, the Senate was enti-
tled to do what the Court might have done had it had the opportunity.
3. Nine Earlier Years. - Perhaps Article I's nine-year rule could
be satisfied if a prospective senator had been a citizen for any nine
years before assuming office, rather than only if the senator had been a
citizen for the immediately preceding nine years. If Dred Scott were
understood to change the law when it was decided rather than to de-
clare what the law had properly always been, then perhaps persons of
African descent were citizens before I857. In that case, Revels would
have been a citizen for the first thirty-five years of his life, from 1822
to 1857, as well as the two years from i868 to 1870. 107
105 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (i9 How.) 393, 400-03 (1857).
106 One shortcoming of this approach for the Republicans of 1870 would have been precisely
that it would not have impugned the Supreme Court's action in Dred Scott. Because departmen-
talism asserts that each branch can interpret the Constitution independently of the others, the li-
cense a departmentalist theory would give the Senate to disregard Dred Scott would also deprive
the Senate of the ability to repudiate Dred Scott. The Republicans of 187o did not want merely
to seat Revels; they wanted to repudiate Dred Scott, root and branch, and indeed they saw their
action as accomplishing that end. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1543 (1870)
(statement of Sen. Stewart) (describing the Senate's seating of Revels as "overruling the Dred Scott
decision" (emphasis added)). To seat Revels on a departmentalist theory would therefore have
been to win a smaller victory while forgoing a larger one.
107 This move could also have solved the problem of the Texas senators, who had been United
States citizens before moving to Texas. See supra note 9o. It would suggest, however, that Revels
and every similarly situated African American would have satisfied the nine-year rule even in
1858, just after Dred Scott and before the Civil War. After all, the literalist would say, Article I
does not require that senators be citizens at the time they serve in the Senate. It requires only that
each senator have "been nine Years a Citizen of the United States" (emphasis added). If the nine-
year rule can be satisfied on the basis of nine years of citizenship not immediately preceding one's
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These three examples are illustrative, not exhaustive, of the possi-
ble ways of adducing a doctrinal basis for seating Revels that does not
require recourse to larger and perhaps more provocative notions.
There are others, even many others, of varying plausibility.108  If we
are properly self-critical, however, we should recognize that it is not
the persuasive power of such technical arguments that drives our view
of the right result. For one thing, each of these technical arguments is
contestable on its own terms, and our intuitions about the correctness
of the result are likely to be much stronger than our confidence in any
one of the proposed technical justifications.
In this respect, our constitutional attitudes share something with
those of most of the senators of 187o, Democratic and Republican
alike. Like theirs, our view of the right result stems from larger con-
election to the Senate, and if Dred Scott changed rather than declared the law of citizenship, Rev-
els could have been qualified in 1858 on the basis of his citizenship from birth to 1857. Indeed,
someone who is uncontroversially an American citizen for more than nine years early in life
would then be forever eligible to serve in the Senate, even if she later renounced her citizenship
entirely. Needless to say, the oddity of these conclusions should weigh against endorsing this
method of declaring Revels eligible.
108 I will here mention one more such possibility, not because further demonstration of the basic
point is needed but because it bears on a controversy in the constitutional law literature. The
possibility I have in mind is that there is a Fifteenth Amendment argument in favor of seating
Revels. According to a view of the Reconstruction Amendments advanced most elegantly by
Akhil Amar, the correct historical understanding of the Fifteenth Amendment would bar racial
discrimination with regard to a whole cluster of "political rights" rather than simply with regard
to voting. See AMAR, supra note 20, at 273-74; Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifteenth Amendment and
"Political Rights", 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2225 (1996). Those "political rights" prominently in-
clude officeholding. See AMAR, supra note 2o, at 273-74. On this view, therefore, the adoption of
the Fifteenth Amendment should have blocked the Democrats from arguing that Revels's race
made him ineligible to hold office.
I have argued elsewhere, however, that the Reconstruction typology of civil, political, and
social rights operated as an unstable rhetorical framework rather than a substantive or analytic
one. Rights that African Americans were to enjoy were called "civil," and specific rights moved
from one category to another depending on whether the speaker wanted to argue that African
Americans were entitled to enjoy those rights or not. In the twentieth century, as the idea of lim-
iting rights by race grew less and less tenable, more and more rights (including voting itself, once
the core of the "political rights" category) became classified as "civil rights." See RICHARD A.
PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 153-74 (1999). On my view, therefore, the
historical record does not support the idea that the Fifteenth Amendment was originally under-
stood to guarantee a stable and identifiable bundle of "political rights."
The history of the Revels debate supports my view. Consider that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment was ratified in February of 1870, in the days just before Revels arrived in the Senate. (The
ratification process was complete when Iowa ratified the Amendment on February 3, unless New
York's withdrawal of its ratification is considered valid, in which case ratification was complete
when Nebraska ratified on February 17.) If senators in 187o had understood the Fifteenth
Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination not just in voting but also in a broader set of "politi-
cal rights" including officeholding, one would expect the just-ratified Fifteenth Amendment to
have played a prominent role in the Revels debate. But in fact, no senator mentioned the Fif-
teenth Amendment during the three days that the Senate discussed Revels's qualifications. That
omission strongly suggests that informed Americans in 187o did not understand the Fifteenth
Amendment to confer a package of "political rights" that included officeholding.
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victions. Also like them, we want more than a merely technical justi-
fication. Indeed, if we were to accept a technical resolution, it would
probably be only as cover for the vindication of a larger principle. Ac-
cordingly, this Part now turns to exploring two candidates for a larger
principle that would more authentically justify our intuitions about the
correct result.
B. Race and Revolution
Like some of the senators in 1870, many twenty-first-century law-
yers might articulate the larger principle behind seating Revels as a
simple normative commitment to racial equality. In the year 2006, al-
most all Americans believe that it is wrong to disqualify someone from
an elective office on the grounds that he or she is of African (or any
other) descent. Other modern lawyers, following other 1870 senators,
might concentrate on historical arguments about the legally transfor-
mative nature of Reconstruction. In the last generation, several works
of constitutional theory have promoted the idea of Reconstruction as a
period of regime change, a revolution rather than a mere reform. 10 9
That perspective could support the view that the Civil War and Re-
construction had a greater capacity to unmake antebellum authority
than the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments expressly
specify. Neither of these principles standing alone, however, can ade-
quately resolve the Revels case. Instead, the two work together, and it
is their joint operation that drives our sense of the right result. As was
true for the senators of 1870, our views about constitutional history are
bound up with our views about normative issues like racial equality,
and what we think along one dimension is likely to affect what we
think along the other.
To see how the normative commitment to racial equality is not suf-
ficient to explain a modern intuition about how the Senate should have
resolved the Revels issue, consider a hypothetical variant in which the
issue arose in 1858, one year after Dred Scott, rather than in 1870.
Suppose that a state in 1858 had - quite improbably - named a
black person to represent it in the Senate. If senators in 1858 had con-
cluded that under Dred Scott the black would-be senator could not sit
- as I suspect most of the Senate would have concluded in 1858 -
our modern reaction to their decision would probably differ from our
reaction to the Democrats of 1870, even though the raw racial equality
question is the same. Most modern observers are likely to regard the
Democratic attempt to bar Revels in 187o as not just wrong but as
outrageously so. In contrast, we might take a more temperate view of
a decision to follow or defer to Dred Scott in 1858, even if many of us
109 See sources cited supra note 20.
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disagreed with the Supreme Court's judgment. Whatever outrage we
might muster at such a senatorial decision in 1858 would be largely
derivative of outrage at Dred Scott itself. And many people today, I
suspect, would take the view that a decision to bar a proto-Revels in
1858 would have been legally reasonable, or even legally correct, albeit
morally disturbing.
Obviously, the difference between 1858 and 1870 is a matter of the
Civil War and Reconstruction. Less than obvious, however, is what if
any particular occurrence of the intervening period changed the rele-
vant legal terrain. Part of the reason why the Democrats had a ten-
able argument against Revels was that no specific action of a legal au-
thority during those years clearly solved the problem of the nine-year
rule. Reading the Fourteenth Amendment as retroactive was an at-
tempt to identify the adoption of that Amendment as such an action,
but the arguments for retroactivity were vulnerable at best. The text
of the Amendment says nothing about retroactive effect, and as the
Democrats insisted, prevailing canons of interpretation at the time sug-
gested that legal enactments should not be presumed to operate retro-
actively. 1 ° Indeed, shortly after Revels was seated, the Supreme
Court twice refused to give retroactive force to the Thirteenth
Amendment, noting that "the language of the amendment... [was]
wholly silent upon the subject" of retroactive application."' Absent
some reason to differentiate between the Thirteenth and the Four-
teenth Amendments, these decisions bolster the Democratic claim that
the Fourteenth Amendment lacked retroactive force.
The modern intuition that the Senate acted correctly in seating
Revels stems, I suggest, neither from racial egalitarianism of its own
110 See, e.g., Murray v. Gibson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 421, 423 (1854) ("As a general rule for the in-
terpretation of statutes, it may be laid down, that they never should be allowed a retroactive op-
eration where this is not required by express command or by necessary and unavoidable implica-
tion."); Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Kent, C.J.) ("It is a principle in
the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent par-
liament, is not to have a retrospective effect."). Both of the preceding authorities address the rules
of statutory rather than constitutional construction, but there are good reasons to think that the
principle they describe would apply in constitutional cases as well. For one thing, then-Chief Jus-
tice Kent's emphasis that the presumption applies to laws passed by an "omnipotent parliament"
suggests that even an unconstrained lawmaker - analogous in the American system not to a leg-
islature passing a statute but to the People enacting a constitutional amendment - is subject to
the presumption. The Supreme Court so understood the principle as applied to the Thirteenth
Amendment.
III Osborn v. Nicholson, 8o U.S. (I3 Wall.) 654, 662 (1872); see also White v. Hart, 8o U.S. (13
Wall.) 646, 652-54 (1872). In each of these cases, the plaintiff had sold a slave in the prewar
South, and the money due under the contract remained unpaid at the time of emancipation.
When the plaintiffs sued to collect their debts at the end of the i86os, the defendants argued that
the contracts were legally void. The Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiff in both cases, explain-
ing that to regard the Thirteenth Amendment as having annulled the contracts at issue would im-
properly construe that Amendment as having retroactive force.
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force nor from a general view of the legal effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but from a fusion of the two. In other words, we can
understand the Civil War and Reconstruction as having nullified as-
pects of the prior legal order that harmed African Americans. It
would be extravagant to claim that events of the i86os erased all of
that previous system. Nobody thinks that the Civil War and Recon-
struction cast doubt on whether Presidents should serve four-year
terms. Instead, determining what survives a revolution and what does
not requires figuring out what is central to the content of the new con-
stitutional departure. 1 12  That task entails contestable interpretive
choices. And one reasonable choice would be to construe Reconstruc-
tion's constitutional changes as focused on eliminating special burdens
on African Americans. The Supreme Court articulated this view in
landmark decisions during the 187Os, 1 13 and the Senate's decision to
seat Revels can be understood in the same terms. 114
Such a reading of constitutional law in 1870 is driven by an inter-
pretation of the meaning of historical events. It draws on the text of
112 See i BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 86-9o, 94-99 (i99i) (de-
scribing the process by which constitutional interpreters synthesize multiple creative periods in
constitutional history).
113 See Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303, 306 (i88o) (stating that the Reconstruction
Amendments had the "common purpose [ofl securing to a race recently emancipated... all the
civil rights that the superior race enjoy[s]"); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (i6 Wall.) 36, 71
(1873) (stating that "the one pervading purpose" of all three Reconstruction Amendments was "the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection
of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him"). The Court acknowledged that only the Fifteenth Amendment
spoke expressly of race or color, and it conceded that nonblacks could claim the protection of, say,
the Thirteenth Amendment if they were actually held in a state of slavery. Nonetheless, the core
of Reconstruction's legal reformation focused on blacks and was to be understood in that light.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71-72.
114 Consider, then, a hypothetical variant on the slave contract cases. Suppose that instead of
having to pass on the continuing validity of a contract whereby a white seller sold a black slave to
a white buyer - as happened in the cases that actually reached the Court, see, e.g., Osborn, 8o
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 663 (noting that no party to the suit was "of the colored race lately in bondage")
- the Court had considered a case in which a white master had manumitted a black slave in
i86o in exchange for a promised share of the former slave's future earnings, payable in 187o. The
Court might well have looked more favorably on such a former slave's contention that the Thir-
teenth Amendment annulled his contractual obligation than it did on the parallel contention of
white litigants in Osborn and White, even though the cases would not differ in terms of the prin-
cipal rationale that nineteenth-century authorities (including Osborn and White) gave for the pre-
sumption against retroactivity: the policy in favor of protecting private rights once vested rather
than unraveling transactions on which parties had come to rely. See, e.g., id. at 662. The hypo-
thetical manumitter's right to payment would have been legal when contracted for and fully
vested before slavery became illegal, just like the rights of the actual plaintiffs in Osborn and
White. Instead, the difference between the hypothetical case and the actual ones is a matter of
Reconstruction's special relationship to the freedom, rights, and status of black Americans, espe-
cially those formerly held as slaves. On that principle, the Thirteenth Amendment might have
been understood to annul the manumitted slave's contractual obligation even if it could not annul
debts owed on other slave contracts.
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the Reconstruction Amendments, but it is not limited by them: on this
model, the Amendments are partial indicators of the scope of the new
constitutional departure rather than the exhaustive source of authority
for that departure. Other events, including secession, the war itself,
the transformation of the war into a crusade against slavery, the emer-
gence of black soldiers and local black officeholders, and the early
course of Radical Reconstruction, all combine with the passage of the
Amendments to form a narrative, or a set of images, with a social
meaning that speaks to the changed status of black Americans and
says more than the Amendments say on their own. On such a reading,
the constitutional rupture is most pronounced when the status of black
Americans is at issue. Accordingly, this larger meaning of the Civil
War and Reconstruction could justify nullifying the continuing legal
consequences of Dred Scott in the Revels affair.
Two further notes are in order about this line of thought. First,
any version of this idea that would justify seating Revels in the Senate
requires interpreting Reconstruction to have had its special transfor-
mative force even when the African Americans whose status was at is-
sue were not themselves slaves. After all, Revels was born free. This
is a reasonable way to read Reconstruction, given that two of the three
Reconstruction Amendments eliminated racial disabilities beyond the
mere point of slavery and that various other governmental actions in
the 186os advanced the status of free blacks as well as former
slaves. 115
Second, the principle that the Reconstruction Amendments should
be interpreted to eliminate continuing legal disabilities on black
Americans is not the same as a principle stating that those Amend-
ments should be interpreted as having retroactive force in all cases in-
volving the interests of black persons. The latter principle might lead
to results that no court in the nineteenth century or since would have
countenanced, such as permitting freedmen to sue their former masters
for battery, false imprisonment, conversion, unjust enrichment, and so
forth. 116 The idea of interpreting the Amendments to block the ante-
bellum order from visiting continuing disadvantages on African
Americans is a more moderate proposition in that it does not invoke
state power to remake existing arrangements of property and power.
On another level, however, it is also a more radical position, because it
115 For example, the First Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867), granted
Southern black men the right of suffrage. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 2 72-80 (1988).
116 See generally Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification,
Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (2004); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
689 (2003).
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depicts the i86os as a rupture in constitutional time. That was then;
this is now.
C. Transitional Justice
i. A Problem of Legitimacy. - The idea of the i86os as a rupture
in constitutional time suggests another possible basis for the modern
intuition that Revels should have been seated, one that deals directly
with the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution." 7 Reconstruction
posed a problem of transitional justice. 1 8 A caste society changed its
rules to become more inclusive, but as is often the case in such transi-
tions, the old insider group sets the terms of the new inclusion." 9 The
Revels controversy was a microcosm of that larger situation. Hiram
Revels was physically present when the Senate debated his qualifica-
tions, 120 but he did not participate in the proceedings. The debate was
conducted entirely by existing senators, all of them necessarily white.
Those discussants decided whether, why, and on what terms a colored
senator could be admitted. In this respect, Revels stood to the Senate
in 187o as African Americans in general stood to the national polity
during the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Amendment
was, after all, written by an all-white Congress accountable to an al-
most all-white voting public. 2 1 The principles of racial equality that
117 On the general subject of constitutional legitimacy, see Fallon, supra note 21.
118 See generally THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRAT-
IZING SOCIETIES (Alexandra Barahona de Brito et al. eds., 2001); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Ver-
meule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 768 (2004) (defining suc-
cessful transitional justice as "a political and economic transition that is consistent with liberal
and democratic commitments").
119 There are exceptions to this pattern, as the modern South African example illustrates. See
Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South
Africa and Israel, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47, 58-63 (2004).
120 Associated Press Dispatches, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 24, 187o, at 3.
121 In i866, when the Thirty-Ninth Congress established the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion that drafted the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, African Americans were excluded from
both Congress and the voting publics to which Congress answered. There were, of course, no
blacks in Congress. Moreover, only five New England states with minuscule black populations -
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island - permitted voting by
blacks (meaning, of course, adult black men who met applicable property qualifications). Thus,
the Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment was composed overwhelmingly of represen-
tatives from white-only polities, with the remainder being representatives from polities that were
not formally white-only but in which black participation was entirely inconsequential. Black
America was not part of the political community that formulated the constitutional text.
There was more meaningful black participation at the ratification stage, although only in
states whose ratification processes could not influence the text of the Amendment. Black men
became eligible to vote in the South under the First Reconstruction Act in 1867 and played sig-
nificant roles as both voters and officeholders in several state conventions and governments by
the time of final ratification in 1868. See FONER, supra note ii5, at 281-91; STEVEN HAHN, A
NATION UNDER OUR FEET. BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE RURAL SOUTH FROM
SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 197-213 (2003). The participation of African Americans
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we now locate in the Fourteenth Amendment are thus unavoidably in
tension with the enactment process from which the Amendment's au-
thority might be thought to derive. Once racial equality is a core con-
stitutional value, it is hard to make sense of an amendment adopted
only by whites as having been adopted in a democratically legitimate
way.
It does not follow, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment is il-
legitimate. Constitutional theory could not bear that conclusion, be-
cause all elements of the Constitution adopted before the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments were approved by limited
polities that would now be considered democratically illegitimate.12 2 It
does follow, however, that the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment cannot rest only on the claim that it was democratically enacted.
Instead, the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment (and of the con-
stitutional regime generally) rests on several factors acting in combina-
tion. 123 In addition to methods of enactment, these factors include the
subjective identification of citizens with the regime 12 4 and the substan-
tive justice that the law delivers.1 25
Factors like these, rather than the process by which the Amend-
ment was adopted, would have to do most of the work if a Fourteenth
Amendment (and indeed a whole Constitution) written exclusively by
whites were to be legitimate authority for African Americans. If the
could therefore be part of a sophisticated originalist inquiry into the ratifiers' understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to an inquiry into the intent of its drafters. Any such in-
quiry, however, should keep in mind that the ratifying conventions did not have the opportunity
to shape the text of the Amendment. The only ratifying conventions with significant African
American participation were those of Southern states, and the readmission of those states to rep-
resentation in Congress depended on their ratifying the Amendment that Congress had written.
Accordingly, nonratification would have brought continued non-representation rather than a sec-
ond chance to draft the text.
122 On this problem as applied to both the original Constitution and the Civil War Amend-
ments, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 6o B.U. L. REV.
204, 230 (198o).
123 See Fallon, supra note 2 1, at 1793 (arguing that constitutional legitimacy does not rest on "a
single rock of legitimacy," but rather on "shifting sands").
124 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Reply, Legitimacy and Obedience, 1i8 HARV. L. REV. 1854,
1861-62 (2005); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6, 332 (2003) (stating that citizens' views
of legitimacy will depend on whether they believe that the path to leadership within the system is
open to all, including people like themselves).
125 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV.
CONST. STUD. 1oi, 107-09 (2003) (discussing the importance of substantive justice in creating
constitutional legitimacy). Other relevant factors include the possibility of changing the constitu-
tional system through democratic politics, see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and the benefits of the rule of law, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
How To Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV 535, 549-50 (1999) (arguing that consti-
tutional theories should be judged on their ability to maintain the rule of law, preserve political
democracy, and protect substantive rights, as well as on the extent to which they "fit" the
Constitution).
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Constitution as amended were sufficiently just in its treatment of Afri-
can Americans, or if it afforded African Americans realistic possibili-
ties of using the political system to address inequities held over from
the old regime, then the new order could achieve legitimacy in spite of
its racially exclusive pedigree. 126  Conversely, the legitimacy problem
would be aggravated if postwar law were substantively unfair to
blacks. The problem would be even worse if continuing black disad-
vantage were built into the constitutional framework itself and there-
fore extremely difficult to overcome, 127 even once blacks were admit-
ted to the normal political process.
Reading continuing black disadvantage into the Constitution would
have been exactly the result of acceding to the Democratic senators'
argument about the nine-year citizenship rule. Moreover, given the at-
tention that the country's black population paid to the affair,"28 a sena-
torial decision not to seat Revels would have sent a powerful signal
that the official rules of American politics still excluded African
Americans from equal participation. By seating Revels, the Senate in-
stead increased the substantive justice afforded to African Americans,
fostered visible black participation in the political process, and per-
haps, as a result, gave blacks more reason to identify themselves with
the constitutional regime. To be sure, the Democrats' argument had a
certain rule-of-law appeal, and the rule of law is also one of the com-
ponents of legitimate government. 129  Given the problem of transi-
126 There is an instructive although imperfect parallel here between a newly included group at
a moment of transition and the situation in which every nonfounding generation of Americans
finds itself by virtue of not having written the Constitution. This is the familiar dead-hand or
intertemporal problem of constitutional law. Some theorists believe this problem to be soluble,
and others do not; among those who do not, a standard and reasonable move is to say that consti-
tutional law and theory should focus on issues of substantive justice rather than on anything
about the history or origins of the Constitution. See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND
HISTORY 8 (1992).
127 See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
877 (2003) (deeming the basics of American constitutional law "virtually unamendable" as a prac-
tical matter); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 355, 362 (1994) (arguing empirically that the United States Constitution is among the most
difficult constitutions in the world to change).
128 Unsurprisingly, black newspapers focused a great deal of attention on Revels in February of
1870, just as newspapers read predominantly by white audiences did. See, e.g., Hiram R. Revels,
U.S. Senator-Elect from Mississippi, FRANK LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER (N.Y.), Feb.
26, 187o, at 4o1; Geo. B. Vashon, The Citizenship of Colored Men, THE NEW ERA (D.C.), Feb.
24, 187o, at i (advancing the view that, under a correct interpretation of constitutional law, black
Americans had been citizens since the Founding, and describing Revels as a symbolic embodiment
of black political potential who would furnish proof of "negro capacity in statesmanship"); see also
Illustration, Administering the Oath to Hiram Revels, Colored Senator from the State of Missis-
sippi, in the Senate Chamber of the United States on Friday, February 25, 1870, FRANK
LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER (N.Y.), Mar. 12, 187o, at 425 (full-page drawing of Revels
taking the oath of office).
129 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 125, at 539.
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tional justice that the country faced in 187o, however, the Senate's
choice to seat Revels was probably a significant net improvement for
the cause of democratic legitimacy.
2. A Solution from Legislative Constitutionalism (and a Reading of
Section 5). - Understanding the Senate's action as necessary for fos-
tering the legitimacy of the postwar constitutional order points to an
underappreciated feature of a legislature's role in constitutional inter-
pretation. During a political transition like Reconstruction, an elected
body like Congress may be more likely than the courts to redress prob-
lems of legitimacy if given the power to do so.
If the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning were fixed at the moment
of ratification, no mechanism (short of further constitutional amend-
ments) could authorize a greater constitutional change than the white-
only polity had approved. The very terms of the equality offered to
African Americans would be limited to whatever white Americans had
chosen to give. Those terms could not be altered even if the overall
calculus of democratic legitimacy argued strongly for doing so - and
even if a majority of all voters, including black voters, favored further
reform. On the other hand, if some branch of government likely to re-
spond to the needs of the newly enfranchised population had the
power to interpret the Reconstruction Amendments expansively, there
would be a straightforward means of adjusting the terms of the new
constitutional order in ways that would bolster the regime's legitimacy.
Such expansive interpretations could render the law more substan-
tively fair to African Americans. To be sure, any such adjustments
would need the approval of a majority of the representatives of the
polity overall, rather than reflecting exactly the preferences of the
newly enfranchised black population. But some such limits would
surely be appropriate - legitimacy cannot require that a newly en-
franchised minority group be permitted to rule unopposed - and the
possibility of some adjustment would be an improvement over the
static and insufficiently democratic set of constitutional rules otherwise
on offer. Partly as a result of such increased justice and partly for
symbolic reasons, expansive interpretations of the Reconstruction
Amendments could also encourage African Americans to identify sub-
jectively with the government. And improvements in the substantive
justice of the law and the subjective identification of African Ameri-
cans with American government could mitigate or even overcome
the democratic legitimacy problems inherent in the Constitution's
formation.
It is not impossible for a court to be the institution that interprets a
constitutional provision expansively. As a matter of institutional de-
sign and the realities of Reconstruction history, however, Congress
would have been a better candidate to fulfill that function in the years
after the Civil War. Unlike the Supreme Court, the postwar Congress
was a frequently elected body whose constituents quickly came to in-
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clude large numbers of African American voters. Many members of
Congress accordingly had clear reasons to respond to the needs and in-
terests of African Americans. To be sure, courts as well as legislatures
generally accommodate changes in public opinion over the long run,
130
but addressing the problem of legitimacy during Reconstruction called
for a certain timeliness of response. Given the institutional differences
between the two branches, one should expect the postwar Congress to
have been at least as friendly to black interests as the postwar Court.
And indeed, as a historical matter, it was.
131
The advisability of letting Congress adjust the constitutional bal-
ance after black men became voting citizens suggests a new way to
understand Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like the other
Reconstruction Amendments, but unlike any antebellum amendment,
the Fourteenth Amendment contains a final section empowering Con-
gress to "enforce" its provisions through "appropriate legislation.
' 132
One of the central debates in modern constitutional law concerns
whether Congress's enforcement power includes the authority to define
(or participate in the definition of) the substantive content of the Re-
construction Amendments or merely the power to implement judicial
constructions of those amendments (or, on an intermediate view, the
power to "overenforce" the Amendments with prophylactic laws that
go a bit beyond what judicial rulings require). 133 Given the need for
affirmative efforts bolstering the Constitution's democratic legitimacy
once black men were recognized as full members of the polity, congres-
sional power to legislate expansively under the Reconstruction
Amendments would enable "normal" political processes to adjust the
ground rules handed down from a time of racially exclusive
government.
The preceding argument for legislative power to construe the Re-
construction Amendments is not offered as an account of anyone's
original understanding of Section 5. It is, like the ideas in this Part
generally, a suggestion that might make sense for modern interpreters.
More specifically, it is a suggestion that might (or should) appeal to
130 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (stating that the Supreme Court's views "are never for
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States").
131 See infra Part III, pp. 1716-30.
132 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
133 See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court,
I15 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Post & Siegel, supra note 56; Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Com-
pare Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) (holding that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment empowers Congress to legislate beyond the boundaries of judicial enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment), with City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 52 7-29 (I997) (sharply lim-
iting Morgan).
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readers who credit the idea that considerations of democratic legiti-
macy can justify our intuition that Revels should have been seated. It
may or may not make sense to apply this suggestion to modern cases
implicating the scope of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment: after enough time has passed, the force of transi-
tional justice arguments becomes subsumed within the general in-
tertemporal problem of constitutional law. (Because no one alive
today participated in shaping the Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps no
subpopulation can demand adjustments based on the exclusion of their
nineteenth-century forerunners. Perhaps we are now all in the same
democratically deficient boat.) But irrespective of its applicability in
the twenty-first century, the idea that democratic legitimacy called for
giving the nineteenth-century Congress a broad warrant to construe
the Reconstruction Amendments has implications for our evaluation of
nineteenth-century constitutional decisions.
D. Conclusion
The riddle of Revels's eligibility can be solved by understanding
the Civil War and Reconstruction either as a revolution authorizing
the revision of the prior constitutional regime to a greater degree than
expressly stated in the Reconstruction Amendments, or as an incom-
pletely democratic expansion of the polity that required further exten-
sion as a matter of transitional justice. The two theories are not mu-
tually exclusive, and they occupy somewhat different conceptual
spaces. The former is grounded in the authority of historical events,
and the latter relies on more abstract considerations of democratic
value. One can endorse both, neither, or one but not the other. Ac-
cepting either or both of these principles, however, has implications in
other cases calling for decisionmakers to interpret the constitutional
significance of the Civil War transformation, to address the problem of
transitional justice, or both. The next Part accordingly examines a
prominent Supreme Court decision - the Civil Rights Cases of 1883
- that raised both of those issues, and it asks what implications our
intuitions about Revels should have for our assessment of that
decision.
III. APPLICATION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 are as familiar to constitutional
lawyers as the Revels debate is unknown. In those cases, the Supreme
Court invalidated section i of the Civil Rights Act of I875,134 which
had prohibited racial discrimination in "inns, public conveyances on
134 The Civil Rights Cases, 1o9 U.S. 3, 27, 32 (1883).
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land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement. 1 35 Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress lacked the power to make such a law,
even under its authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. 136
In the i96os, Congress's expanded power to pass antidiscrimination
laws under its Commerce Clause authority limited the practical import
of the Civil Rights Cases,137 but the decision remains good law. In-
deed, the Supreme Court now presents the Civil Rights Cases as ar-
ticulating an especially authoritative interpretation of Reconstruction:
in United States v. Morrison,138 the Court not only followed the hold-
ing of the Civil Rights Cases, but also declared that the 1883 Court
had privileged insight into the meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments.' 39
This Part contrasts the Revels debate with the Civil Rights Cases.
Seeing the Civil Rights Cases through the prism of the Revels debate
helps reveal the degree to which the Court's decision reflected racial
values that modern constitutional law rejects. In contrast to the Sen-
ate in the Revels debate, the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases
aggravated the democratic legitimacy problems inherent in the transi-
tion to a more inclusive polity. Moreover, those legitimacy problems
mattered to a broad audience, not merely to a few constitutional theo-
reticians. Many African Americans interpreted the Civil Rights Cases
as reason to question whether the Constitution could be their Constitu-
tion at all, or the United States government their legitimate govern-
ment. Less than twenty years after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, many black leaders and laypeople came to see the Con-
stitution as "a white people's affair.' 140 Approaching the Civil Rights
Cases with the tools developed in thinking about Hiram Revels can
help explain why.
A. The Climate and the Court
Between the Revels debate in 187o and the Civil Rights Cases in
1883, the country's political center moved significantly. As several his-
torians have chronicled, moderate Northerners began to lose enthusi-
asm for the burdensome federal apparatus needed to police the
Southern states and to protect the rights of free blacks. 14' A severe
135 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § i, 18 Stat. 335.
136 Civil Rights Cases, lO9 U.S. at 15, 25.
137 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as commerce legislation); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
26i (1964) (same).
138 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
139 See id. at 622.
140 Leon F. Litwack, Trouble in Mind: The Bicentennial and the Afro-American Experience, 74
J. AM. HIST. 315, 315 (1987).
141 See FONER, supra note I15, at 524-28.
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economic downturn in 1873 further alienated many voters from the
ruling Republican Party, and the Democrats won a crushing victory in
the 1874 midterm elections, taking control of the House of Representa-
tives for the first time since the i85os. 142 The Civil Rights Act of 1875
was a last-gasp action of the lame-duck Republican majority: recogniz-
ing that the bill would never pass if it were held over until the next
Congress, the Republicans rammed the Act through the House of Rep-
resentatives just ahead of the transition. 14 3 The 1876 presidential elec-
tion was famously close, and the Hayes-Tilden compromise that kept
the White House in Republican hands also marked, in the traditional
telling, the end of Reconstruction. And although the Party of Lincoln
eked out one more presidential victory in i88o, the Congress that con-
vened at the beginning of Garfield's Administration in 1881 was once
again an all-white institution.14 4
To be sure, there remained a strong minority constituency - white
and black - in favor of radical reform. When the Supreme Court de-
cided the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, that constituency responded with
an outpouring of protest the likes of which have been seen only in re-
sponse to decisions like Roe v. Wade,14 5 Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,146 and Dred Scott.141 Moreover, Southern blacks continued to
vote in significant numbers; full disfranchisement still lay ten to
twenty years in the future.148 Nonetheless, the political majority of
1883 was ready to let Reconstruction recede further and further into
the past. The Supreme Court was still composed entirely of Republi-
can appointees. But most of the Justices in 1883, like most other white
Americans at that time, had less of an appetite than they might once
have had for strong racial egalitarianism. Eight of the nine - includ-
ing two of the Court's three Union Army veterans 49 - were willing
to let the Civil Rights Act go.
142 See id. at 5 12-24.
143 See Irving J. Sloan, The Civil Rights Act of 1875: Introduction, in I AMERICAN
LANDMARK LEGISLATION 227, 227-32 (Irving J. Sloan ed., 1976) (describing congressional poli-
ticking on the Civil Rights Act from its introduction through its eventual adoption).
144 See Brief for the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at
app. A, United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (Nos. 94-558, 94-627), reprinted in 38 HOW.
L.J. 665, 690-92 (995) (listing the names and years of service of all African Americans who
served in Congress between 187o and 1995).145 41o U.S. 113 (1973).
146 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147 See infra pp. 1722-23.
148 See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 295, 3o8-16 (2ooo).
149 In addition to Justice Harlan, the sole dissenter in the Civil Rights Cases, Justices Woods
and Matthews had served in the Union Army. The other six had not.
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B. The Decision
The Court described the issue in the Civil Rights Cases as whether
Reconstruction had sufficiently altered the Constitution so as to au-
thorize Congress to make a law that it would not have had the power
to make before the Civil War.'5 0 Its answer was no. Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
gave Congress the power to enforce the substantive provisions of those
Amendments. 5' Writing for the Court, however, Justice Joseph Brad-
ley held that the Thirteenth Amendment concerned only slavery as
such, rather than racial discrimination more broadly. Accordingly,
Congress could not pass the Civil Rights Act under its power to en-
force the Thirteenth Amendment. 152 Neither could Congress pass the
Act as a matter of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, because that clause addressed only states rather
than private actors such as innkeepers and railroad companies. 153
This interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is now consid-
ered compelling as a matter of plain reading, as indeed it seemed to
some contemporary observers in I883. Is4 After all, the sentence for-
bidding the denial of equal protection does begin with the words "[n]o
State shall.' '155 Both then and now, however, others have contested the
strength of this textual argument. According to the common law
background against which the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
innkeepers and common carriers were public servants with a legal
duty to serve all customers impartially. 156 Therefore, the counter-
argument runs, those actors are agents of the state as a matter of law
and accordingly are within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
157
150 The Civil Rights Cases, 1o9 U.S. 3, io (1883) (stating that Congress clearly would not have
had the power to pass the 1875 Act before adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments).
151 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5.
152 Civil Rights Cases, lO9 U.S. at 20-22, 24; id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at io-I i (majority opinion).
154 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases Decided, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1883, at 4 (writing that to many
Americans it would appear that "nothing was necessary but a careful reading of the [Fourteenth
Amendment] to show that it did not authorize such legislation"); A New Civil Rights Agitation,
WKLY. TIMES (Phila.), Oct. 27, 1883 ("[Mlany thousands of the best and most intelligent Ameri-
can citizens ... would have been glad to see the law sustained if there was any real warrant for it
in the Federal Constitution or its amendments. They are compelled to admit, however, that there
was none .... ").
155 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i (emphasis added).
156 See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 282 (i88o);
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 5o8, at 328 (1832); Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 11o YALE L.J. 441, 489-go & nn.233-34 (2000).
157 Civil Rights Cases, 1O9 U.S. at 58-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Joseph William
Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 9o NW. U. L. REV.
1283 (1996) (elucidating this argument). This reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is expansive,
but it is less adventurous than several other well-accepted readings of constitutional text. Indeed,
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Unsurprisingly, these textual arguments were not the last word in the
Civil Rights Cases any more than textual arguments were the last
word in the Revels debate. Instead, larger issues shaped how different
interpreters read and applied the text.158
One of those issues was how much the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion had remade the antebellum constitutional system. The Court de-
cided that there had been little structural change, and Justice Bradley
made the point in several ways. He presented a view of feder-
alism on which the Tenth Amendment barred federal power from
intruding into traditional state spheres,159 and he denied that the Four-
teenth Amendment had overcome or constricted that Founding limit
on congressional power.' 60 Similarly, he reasoned that the limits of
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment were analo-
gous to the limits of congressional power under the Contracts Clause
of Article 1.16s That clause, he noted, did not authorize Congress to
create a federal cause of action in contract cases. 162 But the Contracts
Clause contains no text empowering Congress to enforce its provi-
sions,163 and the Fourteenth Amendment does expressly give Congress
the power of enforcement.164 It would therefore be exceedingly odd to
assume that Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment could
be limited by analogy to Congress's lack of power under the Contracts
Clause - except on a general interpretive assumption that the Consti-
tution's original provisions create a template of governance to which
later amendments should be substantially assimilated, even if their text
seems to contemplate a different set of arrangements. This sense that
the Fourteenth Amendment effected little change in the Founders' sys-
tem of federalism was central to the outcome of the Civil Rights Cases.
it would not be beyond the bounds of judicial practice to apply the Fourteenth Amendment
against parties admittedly not state actors, in spite of the apparently limiting "[n]o State shall"
language in Section i. In other doctrinal contexts, the Court has applied the substance of consti-
tutional amendments to parties other than those specified in the text of the relevant amendments.
An example from the era of the Civil Rights Cases is Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (18go), in
which the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition on the federal courts' exercise
of jurisdiction over a suit against a state by a citizen of "another State" also applies to bar a suit
against a state brought by a citizen of the same state. See id. at 1o-2o. A modern example is the
routine application of the First Amendment against the Executive, despite the fact that the text of
the Amendment is addressed only to "Congress."
158 Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, Ioo HARV. L. REV 1189, 1209-17 (1987) (arguing that constitutional decisions are rarely
made on the basis of text alone).
159 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 15.
160 Id. at i i.
161 See id. at 11-14.
162 See id. at 12.
163 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § Io.
164 See id. amend. XIV, § 5.
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To be sure, there are plausible arguments for the proposition that
the Court acted properly by declining to read the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as sweeping away antebellum visions of limited federal govern-
ment. In the spirit of what Bruce Ackerman has called the "synthesis"
of two prior moments of constitutional lawmaking,1 65 one can under-
stand the Civil Rights Cases as an instance in which the judiciary
asked how the Founding and Reconstruction could both be preserved,
rather than interpreting the later transformative period to obliterate
the earlier one. The idea that such a synthesis properly expresses the
will of the people draws support, as applied to the 187os and i88os,
from the arc of Reconstruction politics over time. As several leading
historians have written, the post-Civil War impulse toward radical
change petered out in the 187os as the country's political center
stopped supporting Radical Republicanism. 166 Democratic electoral
victories in 1874 and the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1876 marked
the limits of Reconstruction and the polity's choice to step back from
certain egalitarian and federalizing reforms. The country then settled
into a regime that was different from the antebellum order but less so
than the Senate that seated Revels would have expected.1 67 Within
this framework, one can see the Civil Rights Cases as implementing
the public's desired balance between continuity and change. 168 Histo-
rians accordingly have described the decision as ratifying the political
settlement that ended Reconstruction. 169
The settlement so ratified, however, was on terms favorable to a
white constituency that had been hostile to the Reconstruction
Amendments and whose elected representatives had opposed the seat-
ing of Hiram Revels. To be specific, it was largely a settlement on the
terms of the Northern Democrats, who held the political center in the
late 187os and early i88os.170 Although loyal to the Union in the Civil
War, this slice of the population had never been enthusiastic about Re-
construction. They had largely voted against adopting the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments at all. 17 1 Even if the Civil Rights Cases represented
an accurate reflection of dominant political opinion in 1883 or an ap-
propriate theoretical synthesis of Reconstruction and the Founding, it
165 ACKERMAN, supra note I12, at 86-99.
166 See, e.g., FONER, supra note 115, at 512-6oi.
167 See id.
168 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 197 (1988).
169 See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 26 (1971)
(describing the Civil Rights Cases as "the juristic fulfillment of the Compromise of 1877," under
which Reconstruction came to an end).
170 See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 2, 81-95 (1999);
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045, 1097 (2001).
171 See BRANDWEIN, supra note 17o, at 2.
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might make modern Americans uneasy to realize that this interpreta-
tion reflected the views of people opposed to the Reconstruction
Amendments - that is, Northern Democrats. Realizing that Northern
Democrats at this time prominently included people like Senators
Vickers, Saulsbury, and the others who had opposed seating Revels
should make that sense of unease a bit more concrete.1 72
C. Race and Continuity
For this association to have real sting, however, it must be shown
that the Court's decision was not merely congenial to people who had
troubling views about race but actually relied on such views to reach
their conclusions. 173  This section analyzes two ways in which the
Court's race-related assumptions shaped its reasoning. First, the
premises of the Court's Thirteenth Amendment argument show the re-
lationship between race and the Court's view of regime change. Sec-
ond, the Court exhibited a substantive distaste for antidiscrimination
laws, irrespective of concerns about federalism. As in the Revels de-
bate, an apparently nonracial constitutional argument (there the nine-
year rule, here the principles of federalism) was bound up with a sub-
stantive view about how the law should deal with issues of race.
i. Regime Change and Dred Scott. - According to the Civil
Rights Cases, Congress could not pass the 1875 Civil Rights Act under
its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment because the lack of
equal access to public accommodations "ha[d] nothing to do with slav-
ery or involuntary servitude.' 1 74 Justice Bradley wrote:
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the
abolition of slavery ... [and] no one, at that time, thought that it was any
invasion of his personal status as a freeman because he was not admitted
to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected
to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public
172 The principal Democrats who argued against Revels were Northerners, in the sense that
none of them represented states that had joined the Confederacy. When Revels arrived in Wash-
ington, those Southern states that already had resumed sending representatives to Congress had
elected mostly Republican senators, much as Mississippi had sent Revels himself. The opposition
to Revels was thus articulated almost entirely by officeholders whose states had been loyal to the
Union. One should not push this point too far: the Democrats in the Senate at the time dispropor-
tionately represented border states - former slave states that had declined to join the Confeder-
acy - rather than the more antislavery states of the Upper North. Nonetheless, the category of
"Northern Democrats" includes those Democrats who sought to bar Revels.
173 Several scholars have claimed that the Civil Rights Cases are tainted with racism. See, e.g.,
OWEN M. FiSS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-i9io, at 362 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993) (asserting
that the Civil Rights Cases rendered Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), "a foregone conclu-
sion"); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 8i HARv. L. REV. 69, 97 (1967).
174 The Civil Rights Cases, 1o9 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
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conveyances and places of amusement. Mere discriminations on account
of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery.
1 7S
The argument here was straightforward. Race and slavery were le-
gally independent. Past discrimination against free blacks showed that
racial discrimination could be and had been practiced against people
who were not slaves. It followed that forbidding slavery did not entail
forbidding racial discrimination.
As an analytic matter, this argument is internally coherent. What it
ignores, however, is that it might be problematic to use the prewar le-
gal status of blacks - even free blacks - as the premise for an argu-
ment about the acceptability of discriminating against blacks in 1883.
To many contemporary critics of the Civil Rights Cases, black and
otherwise, the Court's presumption that it could reason from the ante-
bellum status of free blacks to the state of the law after Reconstruction
was one of the most disturbing aspects of its decision. 176
Before the war, the regime of Dred Scott limited the rights not just
of slaves but of free blacks as well.' 77 In addition to denying that
blacks could be American citizens, Dred Scott had famously an-
nounced that, under the Constitution, blacks had no rights that whites
needed to respect. 78 The legal validity of antebellum discrimination
against free blacks, the Court's critics reasoned, was surely connected
to that proposition. 7 9 In their view, when the Court treated antebel-
lum restrictions on free blacks as a valid basis for ongoing discrimina-
tion, it gave continuing force to legal arrangements rooted in the world
of Dred Scott.180 Indeed, the Court's reasoning was parallel to invok-
ing Dred Scott to show that Hiram Revels - a free man since birth -
was still constitutionally ineligible to sit in the Senate in 1870. Neither
175 Id. at 25.
176 See, e.g., THE BROTHERHOOD OF LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE: AN
INQUIRY CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE THIRTEENTH,
FOURTEENTH, AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS 142-43, 428-30 (I889); The Color Contro-
versy, NAT'L REPUBLICAN, Oct. 23, 1883, at 1 (quoting Col. Robert Ingersoll as saying that the
Thirteenth Amendment had effected a profound change).
177 See generally MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 18io-i86o (ig8i).
178 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (ig How.) 393, 407 (1857).
179 See Family Scrapbook: Civil Rights Cases, 1883, microformed on Papers of Justice John
Marshall Harlan, Series i, Box 2o, Reel 7, Frame 441 (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (reporting a meeting at the City Hall of New Bedford, Massachusetts, approving a resolu-
tion denouncing the Supreme Court for having "by eight-ninths of its influence declared in sub-
stance the legality of the Chief Justice Taney decision, that 'black men have no rights which white
men are bound to respect'"); Civil Rights: The Supreme Court Decision Discussed at a Meeting of
Colored Citizens, OMAHA DAILY REPUBLICAN, Oct. 30, 1883, at 4 (quoting former Nebraska
Senator John Thayer) ("Twenty five or thirty years ago a decision came from out the dark recesses
of the supreme court declaring that colored men had no rights which white men were bound to
respect.... That decision planted seed from which germinated this last decision. To-day... we
are told that the colored race has no rights ... which the white man is bound to respect.").
180 See sources cited supra note I76.
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the (more moderate) Democrats in 187o nor the Court in 1883 main-
tained that Dred Scott was the law in the present, of course. But in
stark contrast to the Senate of 1870, the Court of 1883 had a vision of
regime change narrow enough that even the principles of Dred Scott
retained some force after the revolution.
2. Federalism and Special Favorites. - The Civil Rights Cases
discussed the relationship between the pre- and postwar Constitution
mostly in terms of federalism. As in the Revels debate, however, this
ostensibly nonracial constitutional issue was tied to a substantive ra-
cial one. For although the Court held that the 1875 Civil Rights Act
was invalid because it was beyond Congress's enumerated powers, its
discussion suggested that such a law would be constitutionally prob-
lematic even if it had been passed by a state legislature.
Through the nineteenth century and into the Lochner era, a promi-
nent strand of constitutional jurisprudence prohibited laws that were
deemed "class legislation," meaning laws passed for the benefit of a
subset of society rather than that of society as a whole.18 1 In modern
constitutional law, such legislation is usually considered the valid
product of bargaining among interest groups. At the time of the Civil
Rights Cases, however, such laws were often taken to evince unfair
governmental favoritism and therefore to deny due process of law.182
Justice Bradley saw this infirmity in the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
That Act, he wrote, made blacks "the special favorite of the laws."8 3
Justice Bradley did not mean, of course, that the Act was invalid be-
cause its language protected blacks but not whites against discrimina-
tion, as a modern statute might be invalid if it used express racial clas-
sifications. 8 4 Section i of the 1875 Act was written in a race-neutral
manner, prohibiting racial discrimination against persons of any race
rather than against blacks in particular. 8 5 Instead, Justice Bradley
meant that as a substantive matter the Act had been written for the
protection of black persons and that in operation the people it would
181 See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (developing a thesis that
Lochner-era jurisprudence conceived of a relationship between state and society that did not al-
low class legislation).
182 See id. at 61-99.
183 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
184 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (announcing that all
governmental actions using express racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
185 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335 ("[AII persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law,
and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of
servitude.").
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protect obviously would be black. To Justice Bradley, such a law was
an unwarranted show of governmental favoritism. 18 6
The substance of this objection, however, takes the Court's consti-
tutional criticism of the 1875 Act beyond the federalist framework in
which the Civil Rights Cases might be justified because the objection
had nothing to do with the fact that the law in question had been
passed by Congress rather than by a state legislature. Even today, and
certainly in the 187os and i88os, any racial antidiscrimination law
would be vulnerable to Justice Bradley's objection. Given nineteenth-
century social realities, the power to discriminate in hotel, railroad, or
theater accommodations lay in the hands of white people, and the vic-
tims of any discrimination would overwhelmingly be black. Whatever
disdain the Court had for laws with special favorites must therefore
have been applicable to all antidiscrimination statutes, federal and
state alike. And if the Court was unfavorably disposed toward anti-
discrimination statutes as a substantive matter, that attitude could help
push the Court to resolve a constitutional issue in a way that would
invalidate an antidiscrimination law.
This relationship between race and ostensibly nonracial constitu-
tional issues in the Civil Rights Cases was not identical to the parallel
relationship in the Revels debate. For the Democrats who invoked the
nine-year rule against Revels, white officeholding was a matter of fun-
damental principle. The Justices of 1883 had a more complex orienta-
tion. They were skeptical of affirmative federal efforts to secure black
equality, but they were also not actively bent on enforced white su-
premacy in the manner of the 187o Democrats. It would be more ac-
curate to say that they were unbothered by racial hierarchy than that
they consciously sought to subordinate blacks and used federalism ar-
guments as subterfuge. Thus, unlike Senator Vickers, who signaled
that he would reach for some other argument against seating Revels
once the nine-year rule was no longer applicable, the post-
Reconstruction Court may or may not have looked for reasons to in-
validate state antidiscrimination laws when the federalism issue was
not in play.187
186 Civil Rights Cases, 1O9 U.S. at 25. Today, a facially neutral antidiscrimination law would
not be understood as special favoritism for blacks but rather as guaranteeing equality for all per-
sons, even though in operation such a law would still benefit members of some racial groups more
than others, and predictably so. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 526 (2003). It would be unfair to Justice Bradley, however,
to fault him for failing to conform to a later generation's intuitions. As a matter of substance, he
was correct to think that the law was conceived largely as a protection for black persons and that
in operation it would always or nearly always be invoked by blacks.
187 In the wake of the Civil Rights Cases, several Northern states passed antidiscrimination
laws, and those laws went largely unchallenged. See Donald G. Nieman, The Language of Libera-
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When faced with contestable questions, however, decisionmakers
are routinely influenced by their background preferences on related is-
sues, whether consciously or not. In the Civil Rights Cases, in which a
plausible argument about federalism and the Court's substantive dis-
taste for antidiscrimination laws both tended toward the same result,
the substantive racial view could shape the Court's attitude about how
to resolve the federalism issue. Just as the Plessy v. Ferguson188
Court's comfort with black subordination could bolster its good faith
belief that a segregated-car law did not deny legal equality,189 the Civil
Rights Cases Court's unconcern with continuing racial hierarchy could
help it decide among contestable views about the reach of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
D. Transitional Justice and Democratic Legitimacy
The same set of social realities ensuring that a facially neutral anti-
discrimination law would be in practice a law providing for black per-
sons was also at the heart of a problem of democratic legitimacy that
the Civil Rights Cases ultimately aggravated rather than redressed.
Like the Revels debate, the Civil Rights Cases required a governmen-
tal decisionmaker to deal with a problem of transitional justice. Once
again, a decision affecting the status of African Americans was to be
made by applying a Reconstruction text written by an all-white polity
(that is, the Fourteenth Amendment) to a situation shaped by an ante-
bellum legal background that discriminated explicitly against blacks.
In the Revels debate, the question was whether a Fourteenth Amend-
ment lacking language of retrospective effect could eliminate the last-
ing effects of Dred Scott. In the Civil Rights Cases, the question was
whether the "[n]o State shall" language of the Fourteenth Amendment
should be read narrowly so as to perpetuate black disadvantage, the
origins of which lay in the law of slavery itself.190 This time, however,
the federal decisionmaker did not act to mitigate the shortcomings in
democratic legitimacy that inhered in the process by which the Recon-
struction Amendments were adopted. Instead, the Court's ruling
largely deprived African Americans of the use of the national political
process as a means of improving their position in the polity. And in-
deed, the Civil Rights Cases prompted many African Americans to
tion: African Americans and Equalitarian Constitutionalism, 183o-195 o , in BLACK
SOUTHERNERS AND THE LAW, I865-19oo, at 247, 262 (Donald G. Nieman ed., '994).
188 163 U.S. 537 (I896).
189 Id. at 550-5 1.
190 As noted in section RI.B, alternative readings of the Fourteenth Amendment were suffi-
ciently plausible under the conventions of the time that the Court could have upheld the Civil
Rights Act, had it wanted to do so. See supra p. 1719.
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question whether the constitutional regime was, as to them, a legiti-
mate form of government.
Before the war, black Americans lived either under conditions of
legalized slavery or, if free, under conditions in which the law impeded
their economic advancement. 191 As a result, private property was
overwhelmingly in the hands of white people at the time of emancipa-
tion. Railroads, hotels, and similar businesses were owned almost ex-
clusively by whites. Given that many of these white owners were in-
clined to discriminate on the basis of race, blacks would be
substantially less able than whites to travel and otherwise conduct
their lives in the postwar world. When the Civil Rights Act of 1875
forbade private owners of public accommodations to discriminate on
the basis of race, it mitigated the disadvantages that African Ameri-
cans after 1865 would face as continuing consequences of antebellum
law and racial prejudice.
The Civil Rights Act can accordingly be seen as a use of the politi-
cal process to help bolster the legitimacy of the postwar government.
Again, legitimacy is complex, resting partly on the method by which
laws are made, partly on the opportunity for reforming the laws, partly
on substantive justice, and partly on citizen self-identification with the
regime. 192 The 1875 Act could not cure the democratic defect in the
all-white enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it symbolized
the possibility that the political process might deliver substantively
just results under the new system. 193 As such, the Act could help
compensate for legitimacy problems inhering in Reconstruction's
status as a period of transition from a more exclusive polity to a more
inclusive one.
The ruling in the Civil Rights Cases worked against that possibility.
It narrowed the parameters of potential legislative change, building
into the constitutional framework a limit on the democratic majority's
191 See Charles Snydor, The Free Negro in Mississippi Before the Civil War, in FREE BLACKS
IN AMERICA, i8oo-i86o, at 6, 7 (John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier & Elliot Rudwick eds., 19711)
(footnotes omitted) ("Limitations were also placed on [free blacks] in vocational and other direc-
tions. It was illegal for a free person of color to sell any goods.., in any place other than the in-
corporated towns of the state. Even in towns there were some goods that a free negro could not
sell, such as groceries and spirituous liquors. The business of keeping a house of entertainment
was also closed to this class."). See generally IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 217-49
(1974) (discussing the range of economic obstacles imposed on free blacks, including harsh penal-
ties for failure to pay fines, restrictive apprenticeship laws, disqualification from jobs, and exclu-
sion from certain trades).
192 See supra pp. 1711-13.
193 Indeed, the Act had this symbolic value in spite of its notorious underenforcement. Freder-
ick Douglass, who acknowledged that the Act was not regularly enforced, maintained that it still
had expressive significance: "It told the American people that they were all equal before the law;
that they belonged to a common country and were equal citizens." 4 FREDERICK DOUGLASS,
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 401 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1975).
17272o06]
HeinOnline  -- 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1727 2005-2006
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ability to terminate - or at least temper - the continuing force of ra-
cial hierarchies that were in the past expressly supported by law. In so
doing, the Court's decision aggravated the legitimacy problem in three
ways. First, it reduced the significance of African American political
participation. Yes, blacks could now be voters and officeholders, but
Congress was stripped of much of its power to improve the conditions
of black Americans, thus substantially reducing the benefits of admis-
sion to the political process. Second, the Court's decision exposed Af-
rican Americans to legal discrimination reasonably perceived as sub-
stantively unjust. Third, and as a consequence of the foregoing two
factors, the Civil Rights Cases made it more difficult for many African
Americans to think of themselves as coauthors of the legal regime.
The claim that the Civil Rights Cases aggravated a problem of le-
gitimacy is not merely speculative. It accords with the actual reactions
of many black Americans to the Court's decision. After the Civil
Rights Cases, many African Americans concluded that the Constitu-
tion was not in fact their Constitution and instead questioned the le-
gitimacy, as to them, of the existing government. Addressing what
some contemporary observers described as the largest political meeting
ever held in Washington, D.C., Frederick Douglass declared that the
Civil Rights Cases had nullified the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 and
others echoed the claim elsewhere. 95 Because it was the Fourteenth
Amendment that made blacks American citizens, the idea that the
Amendment had been nullified was tantamount to a declaration that
blacks were once again legal outsiders. As one leading black newspa-
per put it, "[w]e are aliens in our native land," and the government
could not be "worthy [of] the respect and loyalty of honest men.' 96
Another counseled black readers to be "defiant," writing that they
needed to realize they could depend only on themselves and not on the
government. 197
Henry Turner of Georgia, at one time the pastor of the largest
black church in Washington and later a member of Georgia's Recon-
struction legislature, declared that the Civil Rights Cases "absolve[d]
194 Id. at 424 ("[Bly this decision of the Supreme Court the fourteenth amendment has been
slain in the house of its friends.").
195 See Colonel Ingersoll's Bugle Call, DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chi.), Nov. 2 1, 1883, at 4 (saying
that the Court had pronounced the Reconstruction Amendments "meaningless"); The Rights and
Wrongs of the Colored People, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 21, 1883, at i (describing the "deci-
sion of the Supreme Court negativing the Fourteenth Amendment" and the "reversal of the Four-
teenth Amendment by the Court").
196 The Civil Rights Decision, GLOBE (N.Y.), Oct. 20, 1883, at 2.
197 The Recent Decision, CHRISTIAN RECORDER (Phila.), Oct. 25, 1883, at 2, quoted in
BLIGHT, supra note 19, at 3o9.
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the allegiance of the negro to the United States."198 Many people took
this proposition quite seriously. Turner himself ended his days in Can-
ada,199 and others contemplated yet more radical steps. Douglass had
warned that the Civil Rights Cases risked "forcing [blacks] outside of
law, '200 and indeed some African Americans despairingly concluded
that "the only thing left us is to take the law in our own hands."
20
'
White officials did not dismiss these statements as mere talk: in Texas,
reports that several hundred blacks had taken up arms against the
government in the wake of the Civil Rights Cases prompted the gov-
ernor to mobilize the state militia.
20 2
As always, black responses were diverse. Not everyone took so
strong a stance.20 3 But four years after the Civil Rights Cases, when
the Constitution's centennial was celebrated in Philadelphia, the
event's organizers had to significantly reduce their planned "Color-
ed People's Display," which was to have recounted the part that
black Americans had played in constitutional history20 4 So few blacks
wanted to participate in the event that the planned parade floats could
not be populated with actual colored people.20 5  Less than twenty
years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, most of the
black community saw the celebration of the Constitution as "a white
people's affair."20 6
In the way the Court dealt with the transition away from white-
only citizenship, the Civil Rights Cases stand in marked contrast with
the Senate's decision to seat Revels. Rather than allowing the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments to be instruments of pragmatic
evolution toward a more democratically legitimate system, the Civil
Rights Cases retarded that process by insulating inherited hierarchies
against political reform. The earlier Senate had stressed radical
change, but now the Court emphasized continuity. The Republicans
of the Revels debate construed the Civil War to annul express positive
law from the antebellum period even though it was hard to argue that
any specific text in the Reconstruction Amendments required that re-
198 Letter, CHRISTIAN RECORDER (Phila.), Dec. 13, 1883, at i; see also ERIC FONER,
FREEDOM'S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS DURING
RECONSTRUCTION 215 (1996) (describing Turner's background).
199 See FONER, supra note 198, at 216.
200 DOUGLASS, supra note 193, at 398.
201 A Plea for Self Defense, STATE JOURNAL (Harrisburg, Pa.), Mar. 1, 1884, at 2.
202 See From Austin, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 1883, at 4; The Trouble at Gause,
GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 1883, at i.
203 See BLIGHT, supra note I9, at 310 (describing, inter alia, the reaction of Benjamin Tanner,
editor of the Christian Recorder, who argued that blacks should trust the constitutional system
itself to right the judicial wrong).
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sult; the Civil Rights Cases gave force to unwritten antebellum princi-
ples even in the face of Amendments that could reasonably be read to
alter them.
It does not follow that the Court was wrong in 1883, nor does it
follow that the Senate was wrong in I87O. Deciding whether (and to
what degree) the Civil War ushered in a new regime requires an inter-
pretive choice about constitutional history because the historical record
contains themes of rupture as well as continuity. Similarly, just be-
cause a newly enfranchised group was unable to participate in framing
the laws that defined the terms of their inclusion does not mean that
every subsequent decision must be made to favor that group's inter-
ests.2 0 7 What is clear, however, is that the 1870 Senate and the 1883
Court had different views about which problems the Constitution
should be interpreted to solve: those arising from the old system that
led to the Civil War, or those arising from the possibility of too much
change. In striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Civil
Rights Cases both limited congressional power, thus reinforcing ante-
bellum ideas of federalism, and weakened the legal protections of Afri-
can Americans, thus reinforcing racial status hierarchies of prewar
America. In these respects, the 1883 Court's approach was less in
keeping with the Republican Senate of 187o than with the ideas of
moderate 187o Democrats - people like Senator Vickers - who ac-
knowledged some constitutional change but wished to limit its
scope. 208
CONCLUSION
On both sides of the Revels debate, senators understood that they
were adjudicating more than a concrete dispute. Their arguments
about the merged issues of race, history, and legal interpretation were
less significant as a means of deciding whether Revels could sit than as
a showcase for conflicting views of the post-Civil War Constitution.
Thus, not only did the Democrats refuse to accept their inevitable de-
feat without a protracted fight, but most of the Republicans refused to
settle the issue on narrow grounds. Instead, the Republicans insisted
on framing their victory as a matter of broad principles about a transi-
tion in constitutional history. In succeeding years, the disappearance
of the Revels debate from the shared memory of American constitu-
tional interpreters was an important victory for the Democrats, easing
207 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 13-14 (i999).
208 See BRANDWEIN, supra note 17o, at 2-3, 63-68, 94-131 (arguing that between 1873 and
the 1940s, the dominant judicial and legal-historical understandings of the Civil War and Recon-
struction largely tracked the positions of Northern Democrats during Reconstruction); NELSON,
supra note 168.
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the process by which dominant twentieth-century views of Reconstruc-
tion came to track the views of nineteenth-century Democrats who op-
posed adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments more closely than
the views of the Republicans who wrote and ratified them.
20 9
Recovering the Revels debate for constitutional discourse changes
the raw materials of history, altering the tools available to modern in-
terpreters. Bringing Revels to light is thus part of reshaping constitu-
tional discourse at a broad level rather than an attempt to adduce au-
thority for a specific doctrinal proposition. The fact that the Senate
admitted Revels in 187o does not demonstrate that Congress should
today be able to reach private action through its Section 5 enforcement
powers or that the Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided in 1883.
Interpretive tools that can be developed by thinking about the Revels
problem, however, do supply new arguments against the Supreme
Court's ruling in that case. By highlighting the post-Civil War gov-
ernment's need to address problems of constitutional legitimacy at a
time of transition to a more inclusive polity, the Revels debate adds an
important dimension to the literature on the Civil Rights Cases and to
the study of the legislative role in legitimate transition more generally.
It does not follow that the Revels debate establishes the historical
interpretations favored by the 1870 Senate as authoritative for consti-
tutional law today. The Revels debate is only part of Reconstruction
history, and, more importantly, the raw materials of the past do not de-
termine normative meaning in constitutional law. Instead, those who
interpret constitutional history in the present must make choices,
whether consciously or not. The Republicans of 1870 may have hoped
that their words and actions in the Revels debate would promote a
particular set of meanings, and so indeed they can, especially if they
are well known to modern interpreters. But as their Democratic coun-
terparts may have hoped, a different vision of history set out in 1870
could later be redeemed if politics changed course. After Reconstruc-
tion ended, the Democrats' views of more limited change came to
dominate constitutional interpretation. Indeed, eighteen years after
the Civil Rights Cases, even the career of Hiram Revels himself would
be transformed into a symbol of normalization and continuity rather
than one of revolutionary change.
209 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873); BRANDWEIN, supra note 17o at 2, 81-93, 94-131; NELSON, supra note 168, at
193-96; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17o, at 1097-98; see also BLIGHT, supra note 19, at 8, ii,
384-91 (describing President Woodrow Wilson speaking at the fiftieth anniversary of the battle of
Gettysburg of the Civil War as "the 'quarrel forgotten"' and making no mention whatsoever of
emancipation or related matters).
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Revels did not serve long in the Senate. He returned to Mississippi
in 1871, served briefly as Secretary of State,2 10 was widely accused of
(but heatedly denied) having supported the Democratic Party in the
1875 elections that ended Republican control of Mississippi politics, 2 11
and spent many of his remaining years as president of Alcorn Univer-
sity, the country's first black land grant college. 21 2 Having lived to see
both the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, Hiram Revels died in I9Ol and
was buried in Holly Springs. 213
Back in Washington, members of Congress took the occasion of
Revels's passing to propose a revision of the history of his career in the
United States Senate - a revision that would obscure the radical
change of the i86os and promote a vision of continuity in its place.
Revels had assumed office on February 23, 187o. As of that day, Mis-
sissippi was readmitted to the Union. But also as of that day, the
Forty-First Congress had already been sitting for nearly a year. The
timing of Mississippi's readmission thus meant that Revels served only
a portion of a congressional term. Upon his death, however, the Sen-
ate Committee on Privileges and Elections voted to pay his estate a
senator's salary for the time that Revels had missed, back to the be-
ginning of the term.2 14  This decision was a new departure. Many
years earlier, the Senate had decided that senators from readmitted
Southern states who filled vacant seats and began their actual service
in the middle of a term were not to be paid for any time before their
states' readmissions.2 5
If the Senate Committee had broken the rules as a unique memo-
rial for Revels, one might see its action as a renewed endorsement of
the spirit of the Republicans who seated Revels in 1870. Whatever the
formal legal regime governing membership in the Senate, this account
would say, it would be perverse to let the misdeeds of white Missis-
sippi secessionists stand in the way of conferring a benefit on an Afri-
210 See Obituary, supra note i.
211 See S. REP. No. 527, at ioi6 (1876); Letter from Dr. Revels, CHRISTIAN RECORDER
(Phila.), Feb. 24, 1876, at i; Letter of Ex-Senator Revels, CHRISTIAN RECORDER (Phila.), Jan. 6,
1876, at 4.
212 See Obituary, supra note i.
213 See Ex-Senator Revels Dead, Sw. CHRISTIAN ADVOC. (New Orleans), Jan. 24, 19oi, at 8;
see also Untitled Obituary, supra note i i.
214 See 34 CONG. REC. 2948 (i9oi) (statement of Sen. Chandler, Comm. on Privileges and
Elections).
215 See S. REP. NO. 36 (187o). This report was adopted by a full Senate. See CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 69-71 (1870) (approving payment of Virginia's newly seated senators only
from the date of Virginia's readmission to the Union, which occurred in the middle of a congres-
sional term). See also S. REP. No. 182o, at 2 (189o) (reaffirming the Reconstruction practice of
paying senators only from the dates of the readmission of their states and applying that same
principle to determine that senators from newly admitted Western states should be paid only from
the dates of the admission of their states).
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can American like Hiram Revels. Indeed, the Senate might have
shown continuing concern with transitional justice had it refused to
burden Revels on the basis of legal arrangements in which blacks
could have had no voice. Quickly, however, the proposed payment
came to have a different significance. Three days after the Senate
Committee recommended its appropriation to the full Senate, the
Committee re-reported the proposal in an altered form.
2 16 Under the
amended proposal, Revels would be merely one of many people to re-
ceive a retrospective salary adjustment. The Committee also proposed
back payments to fifteen white Reconstruction-era senators from
Southern states who, like Revels, had served partial terms after Con-
gress authorized their states to resume sending representatives to the
national legislature.
2 17
By this action, the senators of igoi symbolically promoted a view
of history different from the one that most of their predecessors had
endorsed in the debate over Revels's qualifications. Retrospectively
awarding senators to the Southern states for times during which those
states had actually been excluded from Congress would help normalize
the history of the i86os, obscuring a narrative of constitutional failure,
chaos, and revolutionary transformation. To be sure, different mem-
bers of the Senate may or may not have consciously intended that im-
plication. A nice gesture is sometimes just a nice gesture. Nonethe-
less, the normalizing aspect of their collective action was consistent
with the predominant and growing impulse among officeholders of the
period to minimize the Civil War conflict.2 18 According to their pre-
ferred narrative, there had been no thoroughgoing rupture in the sys-
tem of government. Once the war ended, the Constitution picked up
more or less where it left off. Yes, black men were now citizens, and
Hiram Revels could even sit in the Senate - if he could get elected.
But when he journeyed to Washington to take his seat, he would have
to travel in separate colored compartments.
216 See 34 CONG. REC. 3189-9 o (i9oi) (statement of Sen. Chandler).
217 See id.; Proposed Amendment by Sen. Chandler to H.R. 14236, 56th Cong. (2d Sess. i9oi)
(listing former senators to be paid); see also Salaries for Former Senators, WASH. POST, Mar. i,
19o, at 4.
218 See BLIGHT, supra note i9, at 35 1-53.
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Id ....I,& W o,. .......... .... .. .......-............... do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since
I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given.no aid, countenance, counsel,-
or encouragement, to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither
sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever, under
any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not
yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution,
CS
within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) E
CA
that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution -5
of the United Statesagainst al enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith L'
and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office
0
on which I am about to enter: So help me God.
A
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